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AEOLUS FIGURED ON COLIC AMULETS

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THE Museum of Classical Archaeology at the University of Michigan has recently acquired a small collection of engraved stones, with a few metal objects; most of them are amulets of the kind conventionally called gnostic — a description which, as is now recognized, is usually misleading. The collection was assembled in the Levant, chiefly in Syria. One of the stones, the occasion of this note, is now a mere fragment, probably a little more than half its original size. It is a piece of haematite, 27 mm. high, 10 mm. wide, and 5 mm. in thickness. When entire it was rectangular, as is shown by the fact that a border-design, a sort of feather pattern, is preserved at the top and right side, and makes a right angle at the upper right-hand corner. After the left side of the stone was broken away the remaining fragment was rounded off at the bottom, perhaps to remove a rough edge and make the piece into a more convenient shape. The fact that the fragment was preserved and re-shaped is not without interest as showing how tenaciously their possessors clung to amulets of this kind. Something of the same sort happened to a rather elaborately carved haematite which came into my own collection from Egypt. It was originally a fairly broad oval, but at some time a splinter was broken off the right side, after which loss the rough edge was ground down and an approximately oval shape restored. In the University's collection there is still another haematite which, after a part of the stone had been lost, was set in a protecting mounting fitted to its altered shape. All collectors, of course, are aware that haematite is peculiarly liable to splintering fracture.

At the right side of the fragment there is a pedestal, or more

probably an altar, on which stands a human figure, apparently male (Fig. 1). He is in a stooping position, and has a sack on his back; his left hand holds the neck of the sack, the right is raised, palm outward, in a gesture of protest or entreaty. In front of the altar there is an eagle standing on the ground with wings raised, the head turned towards the altar. The right wing of the bird and part of its body have been broken away. Above the human figure there is a star, and in front of him, directly over the eagle, there is a triangle or perhaps some solid object of triangular outline, above the apex of which there is a small vertical finial. I cannot explain it unless the designer meant to suggest some idle play upon ἀετός in the two senses of eagle and gable or pediment. There is no inscription.

If any progress is to be made in our understanding of these amulets, it must be by comparing similar specimens wherever they can be found; and the design on this stone would have been very puzzling had not a similar one been published. In a brief discussion of a Copenhagen haematite Professor S. Eitrem has gone far to explain the type, although, as we shall see, some of his observations are in need of correction, and the interpretation can then be carried a step farther.[1] The Copenhagen stone (Fig. 2) belongs to the National Museum (Inv. 7034), and the design upon it is so like the Michigan fragment that it will suffice to note the following differences. On the Copenhagen amulet the human figure stands on the ground, not on an altar. At the top is a crescent moon with a star on each side of it, while a third star is placed in the field between the human figure and the eagle. Instead of a simple triangle in the field above the eagle, the Copenhagen specimen has a more complicated object of uncertain character. Eitrem suggests that it may be a magical basket. There is a difference in the treatment of the eagle, which will be discussed later. Most important of all, the Copenhagen stone bears on the reverse side the inscription πρὸς κωλάνεμον.

[1] Symbolae Osloenses, XIX, 76–77, Fig. 2. Owing to the difficulty of communicating with Norway, I have so far presumed upon Professor Eitrem's well-known generosity as to reproduce his cut without his express permission. It is twice the size of the original stone; the cut of the Michigan stone is one and one-half times the size of the original.

Fig. 1

Fig. 2

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The word κωλάνεμος has not been noted elsewhere, but evidently means colic, as Eitrem saw. He refers to the charm against colic in Marcellus of Bordeaux (29. 23), θεὸς κελεύει μὴ κυεῖν κόλον πόνους; we may add that this passage enabled Drexler to identify as a colic-amulet a ring that Cumont had classed as Mithraic.[2] It is clear then that the Copenhagen stone is an amulet to protect the wearer against colic, and the purpose of the Michigan fragment must have been the same.

That follows from the meaning of the figure carrying the bag; and here it is necessary to correct Eitrem in certain points of observation as well as in his interpretation of the type. He thought that this figure, which he doubtfully describes as female, was winged, and interpreted it as the demon of the disease; but if he had been able to examine the Michigan stone also, I am confident that he would have agreed with me that on both stones the figure is masculine, and that what he took to be wings is simply the bag carried on the shoulder. The stooping posture, and the position of the left hand place this beyond doubt. Now since the time of Homer the idea that the Lord of the Winds had power to control them and confine them in a sack was familiar to every Greek. It may seem absurd to imagine the august Aeolus of the Odyssey as concerning himself with wind in the human body; but such childish nonsense is just what we have to expect and what we actually find in folk-medicine. It is true that human beings were sometimes credited with power to lull the winds,[3] and one might ask whether the person on these amulets might not be a man skilled in wind-sorcery; but magic is less likely to aim at control of a human wind-master than a divine or demonic one. There is nothing strange in the appearance of mythological personages on medical amulets; I mention two examples that have long been known. A figure of Ares, with the inscription Ἄρης ἔτεμεν τοῦ ἤπατος τὸν πόνο[ν], is carved on a haematite of the British Mu-

[2] Eitrem refers to Marcellus 20. 66 for the colic-charm cited above, but in using his memoranda he has apparently exchanged the references for two similar passages. Drexler's article is to be found in Philologus LVIII, 608 ff.; Cumont lists and illustrates the ring in question in his Textes et Monuments, II, 452, Fig. 406.

[3] The sources can be conveniently consulted in A. B. Cook, Zeus, III, 103–106.

seum (56112),[4] and a gem published by H. Koehler in 1836 shows a figure of Perseus carrying the head of Medusa, and the inscription φύ[γε] πόδαγρα [Π]ερσεύς σε διώχι.[5] On the Michigan and Copenhagen stones Aeolus is not the protector against disease, but is associated with the cause of it. To that extent he acts as the demon of colic.

What, then, is the friendly influence that controls the wind-god? This can be sought only in the eagle, which is evidently the counter-charm. The makers of the two colic-amulets represented the wind-god (as colic-demon) checked and intimidated by its superior force. My suggestion that the gesture of Aeolus' right hand is meant to express protest or entreaty is borne out by the fact that on the Michigan specimen he has actually taken refuge on an altar. As for the eagle, it is often represented on gems of the Roman period, but little attention has been paid to its magical powers. However, according to Pliny (N. H. 37. 124) magicians held that if eagles or scarabaei were carved on emeralds (zmaragdus), especially with certain prayers, the amulets would avert hail storms and swarms of locusts. Eagles are actually engraved upon some stones which are proved by the presence of magical words or characters to be amulets. I find brief descriptions of four examples among notes made on the British Museum Collection some years ago. No. 56107, heliotrope: eagle perched upon a pedestal, holding palm-branch in beak, wreath in one claw. Reverse, magical characters. No. 56188, agate: eagle with garland in beak; inscription, SINEMESTVS, meaningless unless it be an Oriental name. No. 56207, pinkish jasper: eagle. Reverse, magical characters. No. 56554, material not noted. On the obverse there is a head, perhaps a portrait, for the stone may originally have had no magical purpose; but it now bears an inscription, apparently meaningless, some letters of which are uncertain. Reverse, eagle on a pedestal; on one side the palindrome αβλαναθαναλβα, on the other ορεοβαρζαγρα. Both words occur

[4] A poor drawing of this stone is given in C. W. King, The Gnostics and their Remains, Pl. M 7.

[5] Mém. Acad. Imp. de St. Petersbourg, 6me Série, 1836, Pl. I, 27. The stone is described on pp. 21–22. διώχι represents διώκει.

frequently in magical papyri and the former at least is very commonly inscribed on magical gems. Two eagle amulets are listed in the Catalogue of the Southesk Collection (Nos. N73, N74).

There are several reasons why the eagle might be supposed to carry magical powers. Its connection with Zeus, its general acceptance as an emblem of kingship, its use on Alexandrian coins as a badge of the Ptolemaic dynasty, the sacredness of the eagle-standards of the Roman legions [6] — all these things may have contributed something to make the eagle a symbol of power and victory, and hence a favorable influence in magic. Especially important in relation to an object of Levantine provenance, such as the Michigan stone, is the fact that in Syria the eagle was a solar symbol; among other evidences of this there is a bronze eagle, brought from Nizib, which rests upon a base inscribed ἥλιος.[7]

One detail still requires consideration. An eagle with a garland occurs, as we have seen, on one of the British Museum amulets mentioned above, on another the bird has both a garland and a palm-branch; and there is still more archaeological evidence to show that either a garland or a palm-branch or both were often combined with the eagle in emblematic designs.[8] C. W. King published in his Antique Gems and Rings

[6] On this subject see A. v. Domaszewski, Die Religion des römischen Heeres, pp. 11–13 [reprinted separately from Westdeutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Kunst, XIV, 1895].

[7] The bronze eagle was published by R. Dussaud (Rev. archéol., 1903, 1, 134–142) in a section of an article on Syrian mythology devoted to the eagle as a solar symbol. Cumont discusses the same topic in pp. 60–63 of his Études syriennes, and in the earlier pages of the same study he illustrates the use of the eagle as a funerary emblem. H. Seyrig judiciously remarks (Syria, XIV, 1933, 255) that the Graeco-Roman tradition of the eagle as the symbol of Zeus persisted alongside the solar significance that it had in the Orient.

[8] As to the eagle with garland on funerary monuments, see Figs. 10, 11, 24 of Cumont's article in Études syriennes; Fig. 27, a gem, shows two eagles with garlands held in their beaks. In Furtwängler's Beschreibung der geschnittenen Steine im [Berliner] Antiquarium there are listed specimens showing the eagle with garland in beak, palm-branch in talons (3288, 3290); garland in beak, thunderbolt in talons (3289); eagle between two Roman standards, garland in beak (3291). These combinations show how imprudent it would be to derive the *mana* of the eagle exclusively from any single source.

(II, 86) a large sardonyx plaque in Vienna, on which is carved an eagle of the Ptolemaic type, grasping a wreath with one claw while the other rests upon a palm-branch. On a small carnelian of the Roman period recently acquired by the University of Michigan there are two winged victories, each holding a palm-branch over the left shoulder, and with the right hand holding out a garland towards an eagle between them. Now on the Michigan haematite (Fig. 1) it is easy to see, despite the injuries, that there is no garland, and that the eagle has his wings raised from the shoulders. Eitrem says that the eagle of the Copenhagen amulet has his wings lifted; but close inspection of the cut shows that the wings are actually folded, and that the object that suggested the appearance of raised wings is a wreath left open at the top and placed behind the bird. Allowance must of course be made for the careless execution of amulets of this kind, but I have been guided by the opinions of three separate observers who were purposely not informed of the question at issue, and upon examining the cut, described the design as "an eagle with a garland behind him." Two possible explanations occur to me; the lapidary may have copied from a pattern so sketchily rendered that he took the raised wings for a wreath; or more probably, as a mere play of fancy, he may have intentionally placed the garland in such a position as to suggest wings.

One final remark apropos of colic-amulets. It should not be forgotten that the very common design of Herakles throttling the lion, of which Eitrem discusses a specimen (p. 76), was recommended as a cure for colic when cut on "Median stone" and set in a gold ring; [9] such is the prescription of Alexander of

[9] Damigeron (de lapidibus, 21, ed. Abel) says "Medius lapis niger est; tritus autem emittit croceum colorem." He goes on to describe some of its powers, but does not mention its use as a remedy or prophylactic for colic. A colleague in mineralogy, Professor C. B. Slawson, informs me that Damigeron's description would fit limonite, an iron ore nearly related to haematite. I have seen several amulets cut on this stone, though they are not common. Pliny (N. H. 37. 71) speaks of Median *zmaragdos*, certainly a green stone, though probably not emerald. The stone described by Eitrem (his Fig. 3) is a carnelian, and there is a similar one in the British Museum (56256) on heliotrope (bloodstone). But I have notes of six other representations of Herakles with the lion, all on red jasper, and I am sure that I have seen others without recording them. Red jasper was certainly the favorite material for Herakles amulets.

Tralles.[10] The point was observed by one of the early students of magical amulets, Jean Chiflet, in the commentary on a series of gems appended to his edition of Macarius' Abraxas seu Apistopistus and his own Abraxas Proteus (Antwerp, 1657; p. 127); and before him by A. Gorlaeus, but less accurately, as Chiflet shows.

[10] Alex. Trall., Book 8 ad fin. (II, 377, Puschmann's edition).

THE FOURTH GOSPEL AND THE CHURCH

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I

There are two important chronological questions in the history of the Fourth Gospel: the date of its composition and the date of its acceptance by the church. The solution of the first depends in large measure on the question of John's use of the synoptic gospels. Did he use them at all? And, if he did, in what way? There can be no doubt that if he knew them he had little interest in their historical value. But does this mean that he had more authentic historical data? Or that he was interested not in history but in theology?

It may be said that John knew Mark, at least. The dissimilarities which Gardner-Smith adduces [1] bear out very well the thesis of Windisch [2] that John intended not merely to supplement but to supplant his predecessors. The gospel cannot possibly be earlier than the turn of the century; its religious background is that of Ignatius of Antioch and the Odes of Solomon, and ecclesiastical tradition, determined to assure its apostolic authority, never put it earlier than the year 98. That at this time all three synoptic gospels were in wide circulation together is very doubtful. It is much more likely that there were several other written gospels in addition to the ones we possess today. The resemblances of John to Luke are not so striking as at first might appear; and many of them can be explained as interpolations into Luke,[3] or actual corrections of the Fourth Gospel.[4]

My thanks are due to Professors A. D. Nock, H. J. Cadbury, and F. C. Grant for their kind assistance.

[1] P. Gardner-Smith, St. John and the Synoptic Gospels (1938).

[2] H. Windisch, Johannes und die Synoptiker (1926).

[3] F. C. Grant in JBL, lvi (1937), 285 ff.

[4] P. Benoit in Rev. Bibl., xlvii (1939), 456. Goguel (Intr. au N.T., iii (1923), 222) cites the personages who appear only in these gospels as proofs of John's use of Luke; but on Annas in the chronology of Luke see my note in HTR, xxxiii (1940), 151 ff., and on Mary and Martha the article cited in note 3 above.

The resemblances to Matthew are so few as to have convinced only an occasional investigator that John used this gospel. But his use of Mark, I think, is clear.

And the use he has made of it seems to be this: the synoptic gospels are really theological only in certain pericopes and in the editorial framework. For the religious needs of the early second century — and perhaps for our own time — they were inadequate. Therefore the author of the Fourth Gospel determined to make one gospel for the church. His gospel is the kirchliche Evangelium von dem göttlichen Heilbringer.[5] This could not be the case with the synoptic gospels, for their especial concern is Jesus of Nazareth, not the Christ who is "the same yesterday, today and forever." They do not make manifest the incarnate Logos of God.

The theological interest of the Fourth Evangelist pervades his book, but it is especially remarkable in his rewriting of the institution of the Lord's Supper. For the synoptists and for Paul the Eucharist was a solemn memorial of the Lord's death, binding the community together in fellowship with one another and with him, and looking forward to his coming again in glory.[6] For the Fourth Evangelist it was the sacrament of the flesh and blood of Christ. The story of the miraculous feeding, though it presupposes the synoptic narrative (for flesh is equivalent to the body, and blood to blood), is John's substitution for the synoptic account. Eschatological material is eliminated or transmuted. Christ's body is not broken, and indeed was not broken in the crucifixion.[7] And for the Last Supper in the synoptic passion narrative was substituted the incident of the foot-washing and the farewell discourses and high-priestly prayer of Christ (xiii–xvii). This foot-washing is not a symbolical version of baptism [8] (the evangelist did not intend to conceal his meaning so thoroughly as that) but a ritual task of brotherly ἀγάπη.[9] It has been suggested that this substitution was made in opposition to the monarchical episcopate, which John "regarded as

[5] Windisch, op. cit., 182.

[6] I Corinthians xi. 26.

[7] John xix. 33, 36.

[8] As H. von Campenhausen in ZNTW, xxxiii (1934), 259 ff.

[9] H. Windisch, op. cit., 77; E. Lohmeyer in ZNTW, xxxviii (1939), 115 ff.

tending to arrogance and mercenary practices." [10] But this interpretation, apparently based on precarious exegesis of the Third Epistle, may be doubted. The monarchical episcopate is later than this.

Such a gospel, needless to say, would have difficulty in establishing itself wherever the synoptic tradition had been accepted. And such, indeed, was the case in much of the second-century church, as we shall see.

QUOTATIONS OR ALLUSIONS

	Barn.	Did.	Ign.	Polyc.	Herm.	II Clem.	Papias	Basilides
Synoptics	1?	1?	7(+4?)	1?	0	1(+3?)	2	1(+?)
John or Ep.	0	0	2?	1	0	0	?	1
	Marcion	Justin	Valentinus	Hegesip.	Ptolem.	Melito	Apollin.	Athenag.
Synoptics	Luke	170	1	3?	4	4	1	13
John or Ep.	0	1	0	0	1	4	1	0

Books used in compiling this table were The Gospels in the Apostolic Fathers (1905), 137; W. Sanday, The Gospels in the Second Century (1876), 382 ff.; and C. Bonner, The Homily on the Passion by Melito Bishop of Sardis (1940), 39 f.

It will be noticed that the only writers who use the Fourth Gospel equally with the synoptics, so far as we can determine, were Quartodecimans.

The figures, while in some instances only approximate, give the general tendency. Cases in doubt are followed by a question mark.

The first witness to the tradition behind John is the Gospel of Peter, which Gardner-Smith dates around the end of the first century (most critics would place it half a century later). But what resemblances there are are due to oral tradition; there are sufficient differences to make literary dependence impossible. As Gardner-Smith well remarks concerning the similarities of Peter 14 (60) to John xxi. 2 ff.,[11] "Except on the theory that John was inventing the whole story and that no one had ever heard of it until he wrote there is not a shred of evidence that 'Peter' has read his account." That this is an early tradition may be seen in its association of the Eucharist with the resurrection, as in the story of the breaking of the bread at Emmaus,[12]

[10] J. Moffatt in Expositor, vi (1910), 3.

[11] JTS, xxvii (1926), 259.

[12] Luke xxiv. 35; see H. Lietzmann, Messe und Herrenmahl (1926), 238 ff., and O. Cullmann in RHPR, xvi (1936), 1 ff.

which Dibelius thinks "has been preserved in an almost pure form." [13]

Did Basilides in the time of Hadrian use the Fourth Gospel? Hippolytus, who says that he did,[14] does not usually distinguish between earlier and later proponents of heresy; and it has been concluded that since Basilides derived exegesis from and built a chronology on Luke,[15] therefore the Third Gospel was the only one he accepted.[16] This would make his usage similar to that of his contemporary Cerdo.[17] But Ptolemaeus, whose theology was similar to Basilides', used John; and Hippolytus' direct quotation must be given considerable weight.

Ignatius, bishop of Antioch, who, says Eusebius, was martyred at Rome in 108, makes use of a crude Logos Christology, it is true. But there is no possible quotation from the Fourth Gospel itself, and it must above all be noted that in the supreme instance where he could best have quoted the Fourth Gospel (in the third chapter of his letter to the Smyrnaeans, a congregation whose relations with John in Acta Iohannis are close) in proof of the risen Christ's being "no bodiless demon," he relied instead on a gospel which was to be left out of the canon![18] Thus there is no evidence in the earliest period for orthodox use of the Fourth Gospel.

And what evidence there is in the next period is almost unbelievably confused. We must carefully distinguish between what is said by the authorities themselves, what is said about them by later writers in general, and what is said by Irenaeus, whose evidence is extremely tendencious.

It must first, however, be remarked that the *existence* of the Fourth Gospel in this period may be taken for granted as a result of the publication in 1935 of P. Egerton 2,[19] an early second-

[13] M. Dibelius, From Tradition to Gospel (1935), 191.

[14] Ref. Omn. Haer., vii. 22.

[15] Fragment from Acta Archelai, 67 (96 Beeson); Clement of Alex., Strom., i. 21 (p. 95 Stählin). [16] So H. Windisch in ZNTW, vii (1906), 236 ff.

[17] A. von Harnack, Marcion (ed. 2, 1924), 32.

[18] Origen, De Princ. i, praef. 8 = Kerygma Petri; Jerome, De Vir. Illustr. 16 = Gosp. of Hebrews; Eusebius, H.E., iii. 36. 11 = unknown. B. W. Bacon, The Fourth Gospel in Research and Debate (1910), 60, takes this argument over from the Oxford Committee's The New Testament in the Apostolic Fathers, 83.

[19] H. I. Bell and T. C. Skeat, Fragments of an Unknown Gospel, etc.

century apocryphal gospel which, while perhaps based on oral tradition, has closer affinities to John than to the synoptists. The author apparently used the Fourth Gospel (and perhaps Luke), "interlarding his narrative with phrases culled from various chapters." [20] Whether the tendency of the new gospel be heretical or not, its fusing of John and Luke recalls the probable quotation of Luke-John by Apelles, Marcion's disciple [21] — though perhaps, as Gregory suggested, he thought he was quoting only Luke.[22] Much more important has been the publication, also in 1935, of P. Rylands Gk. 457,[23] a fragment from the first half, probably early in the first half, of the second century containing John xviii. 31–33, 37–38. This fragment, whose importance cannot be overestimated, since it is the earliest manuscript of any of the gospels, probably was part of a codex containing only John; [24] and the one reading of interest to textual criticism, πάλιν before εἰς τὸ πραιτώριον in verse 33, places it with BCD against SA (Tischendorf). But, as we shall see, these are the principal direct witnesses to the Fourth Gospel before the last third of the century; and it is impossible to say whether the persons who read them in Egypt were members of an orthodox community or not.

The orthodoxy of Polycarp, bishop of Smyrna, is unquestionable, but — whether he wrote in the second or fourth decade of the century [25] — in his one extant work he did not make use of the Fourth Gospel. In the seventh chapter of his letter to the Philippians he says: "Everyone who does not confess that Jesus Christ has come in the flesh is Antichrist." This is similar to I John iv. 2–3 and II John 7; but it does not absolutely require literary dependence, for Polycarp goes on to say that one who denies the resurrection and the judgment is "Satan's firstborn" — this was his taunt at Marcion.[26] But as A. E. Brooke remarks in his commentary, "the passage may be said to *prove*

[20] H. I. Bell, Recent Discoveries of Biblical Papyri (1937), 20.
[21] Hippolytus, Ref. Omn. Haer., vii. 38.
[22] C. R. Gregory, The Canon and Text of the N.T. (1907), 180.
[23] C. H. Roberts, An Unpublished Fragment of the Fourth Gospel.
[24] Ibid., 22.
[25] On this point see P. N. Harrison, Polycarp's Two Epistles, etc. (1936).
[26] Irenaeus, iii. 3. 4; Eus., H.E., iv. 14. 9 mentions only his use of I Peter.

the acquaintance of Polycarp with the teaching contained in the Epistles, or with the man who taught it. It establishes a very high degree of probability that he was acquainted with the actual Epistles." [27] Yet he shows knowledge of neither gospel nor apocalypse.[28] This is a most important fact, since tradition is all but unanimous in ascribing the apocalypse to the reign of Domitian,[29] and its author was clearly connected with the churches of Asia, including the church of Smyrna, which he praises. It may be said, however, that Polycarp's heroes were Paul and Ignatius, both of whom he admired without understanding, and his sympathies were neither with apocalyptic nor with "mysticism." His use of the First Epistle of John is for purely practical purposes. This factor must not be underestimated in the development of the canon of the New Testament.

Polycarp's contemporary Papias, bishop of Hierapolis, found the apocalypse thoroughly congenial. He made use of, quoted from, and built much of his theology on the book.[30] But Papias probably did not ascribe the gospel to an apostle, although he seems to have used the book: Irenaeus quotes his "saying of the Lord" as follows: "in the region (ἐν τοῖς) of my Father there are many mansions." [31] While it must be admitted that this is close to I Enoch lxi. 2, it is equally close to John xiv. 2; and it is probably not derived from oral tradition. To be sure, Papias has no discussion of the gospel's origin; but it has often been suggested that he examines the order and comprehensibility of Mark and Matthew with reference to the norm of the Fourth Gospel. Furthermore, according to Eusebius he used the First Epistle; and tradition associates him with *someone* named John! Irenaeus calls him John's disciple; the anti-Marcionite prologue (think what one will of its historical value) associates them;

[27] The Johannine Epistles (1912), liii; but see Sir E. Hoskyns, The Fourth Gospel (1940), i. 109.

[28] Polycarp's name in a list of users of the Apocalypse, in Jerome's commentary on the Psalms (Anecdota Maredsolana, iii. 2 (1897), 5), is not convincing proof, for the several epistles of Polycarp (Irenaeus, v. 33. 4) may be no more than the one known to us (see note 25).

[29] Clement, Origen, Victorinus, Eusebius, Jerome.

[30] Andrew of Caesarea, In Apoc., 34.

[31] Irenaeus, v. 36. 2.

and most important of all is the incidental reference of Apollinaris to Papias as the disciple of John.[32]

What of his heretical opponent Marcion? Tertullian states definitely that he rejected the apocalypse [33] and implies that he denied the gospel; [34] but since, following Irenaeus, Tertullian believed in the single authorship of the two works, his remark about the gospel is probably an inference from Marcion's silence.

So much for Asia and the remarkable silence about the apostle who traditionally lived there! What of Rome, which during this period was taking her place as arbiter of orthodoxy and leader of the Christian world?

In the earlier period, Clement and Hermas do not know the gospel (it had probably been written only shortly before their time); but Justin almost ignores it, writing about 150. The apocalypse he accepts, and ascribes to John.[35] He uses all three synoptics, for they were written by apostles or their followers.[36] But though believing in the pre-existent Logos he does not adduce the support of the Logos gospel. Convinced of the importance of the Eucharist, he states that in their gospels the apostles delivered the command which was given them by Jesus; [37] and its omission of the institution of the Eucharist is the most striking feature of the Johannine passion narrative. On the subject of rebirth in baptism he quotes a saying of Christ: *ἂν μὴ ἀναγεννηθῆτε, οὐ μὴ εἰσέλθητε εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν τῶν οὐρανῶν*.[38] This is similar to John iii. 5, especially in the later text of Codex Bezae, which may be conformed to Justin's reading. It is similar also to Matthew xviii. 3 and to the Pseudo-Clementine Homilies, xi. 26; and in view of Justin's use of the synoptics and their tradition some one hundred and seventy times,[39] it would be more likely to come from the apocryphal

[32] Cramer, Catena in Act. i. 18 (iii. 12); Professor Nock points out that it was customary in antiquity to associate writers in a teacher-disciple relationship. Thus Jerome calls Lactantius a disciple of Arnobius — but evidence of Lactantius using Arnobius has not been produced.

[33] Adv. Marc., iv. 5.

[34] De Carne Christi, 3; Adv. Marc., iv. 3 f.

[35] Trypho, 81.

[36] Ibid., 103.

[37] Apol., i. 61.

[38] Ibid., i. 65.

[39] J. Drummond, Character and Authorship of the Fourth Gospel (1904), 100; one should make some deductions for the apocryphal gospel Justin used.

gospel, somewhat like Matthew, which he seems to have used early in his career, [40] than from a gospel he quotes nowhere else; but the context, I think, makes it clear that he used the Fourth Gospel. "It is clear to everyone that it is impossible for those once born to enter into the wombs of their mothers." This is precisely the objection of Nicodemus in John iii. 4. There are, it is true, parallels to this doubt about the possibility of rebirth; but we may reject the similar question in the Right Ginza [41] as probably derived from the gospel itself; and the question of Tat in the Corpus Hermeticum xiii [42] is more general.

Nevertheless he quotes this gospel far less frequently than the synoptics — less frequently even than his apocryphal gospel. Why? Probably because the Fourth Gospel was not one of four; it was one of many; and the Roman church at the middle of the second century accepted only the three gospels for which prologues had been composed.[43]

Thus far we have considered the period of roughly half a century during which the Fourth Gospel was in existence but used extensively by no orthodox writer, Asiatic or Roman, except the author of the gospel of P. Egerton 2, whose orthodox or heretical sympathies cannot be demonstrated. The next period is one in which the gospel is revised; an appendix (chapter xxi) is probably added to make clear its claim for apostolicity and truth. One occasion of this appendix might be the publication of the three-fold gospel, possibly at Rome but almost equally probably in Asia Minor. For this purpose Luke, recovered from the Marcionites, was provided with a prologue which explained that it was not the only gospel and that it had not been interpolated by the protectors of Judaism, as Marcion had charged in the Antitheses.[44] Prologues were provided at the same time

[40] E. R. Buckley in JTS, xxxvi (1935), 173 ff. I may suggest that he had found this work in Palestine; in Rome the church would probably recognize only the synoptic gospels. It may have been Predicatio Pauli; compare the fragment in Routh, Rel. Sacr., v. 325 f., with Trypho, 88. It is of course possible, on the other hand, that his variants from synoptic tradition are due to oral material and folk lore or (in some cases) memory quotation.

[41] Right Ginza v. 3 (188 Lidzbarski).

[42] R. Reitzenstein, Poimandres, 339; W. Scott, Hermetica, i. 238. 20.

[43] Compare the possibly Roman II Clement, which uses the synoptics and an uncertain apocryphal gospel.

[44] Tertullian, Adv. Marc., iv. 4.

for Matthew and Mark — the anti-Marcionite prologues.[45] But no prologue was provided for John! The one which we now possess is incredibly confused; if it contains any real information that information probably concerns the apocalypse; and it is valueless to show the early acceptance of the Fourth Gospel, probably being based on a misunderstanding of Tertullian.[46]

In 154/155 comes one of the few clearly datable events in this period: Polycarp's visit to Rome to discuss with Anicetus the right day for observing Easter. The Asiatic churches and the Asiatic community at Rome [47] upheld the 14th Nisan, the day of Passover and Passion, while Rome adhered to a near-by Sunday on which to celebrate the Resurrection. Bacon infers from this visit that for it the appendix was added to the Fourth Gospel to guarantee its apostolic authority; [48] but there is no proof of this. On the other hand, Richardson has argued that the "writings of the early fathers seem to reflect the synoptic chronology," even on the Quartodeciman side; [49] but since both Melito and Apollinaris are exceptions to this statement, and Irenaeus is not a good witness for Asiatic custom, we may agree that at a very great age Polycarp may have been a witness to the use and (perhaps) the apostolicity of the Fourth Gospel. But Pionius' Life of Polycarp, which, following Streeter,[50] we may regard as preserving valuable early traditions which flatly contradict the tendencious stories of Irenaeus, tells nothing whatever about John in Asia. Thus we may incline to believe that as long as Polycarp was alive, and for a brief period after his death while memories of his real personality persisted, there was in Asia not the slightest trace of the Johannine legend.

But suddenly in the last third of the century the gospel came into very wide use, perhaps as the result of the addition of the

[45] D. de Bruyne in Rev. bénédictine, xl (1928), 193 ff.; A. von Harnack, Sitzungsberichte der preuss. Ak. (phil.-hist. Kl.), 1928, 322 ff.; my own notes in ATR, xxiii (1941), 231 ff.

[46] B. W. Bacon in JTS, xxiii (1922), 134 ff.

[47] G. La Piana in HTR, xviii (1925), 216.

[48] JBL, l (1931), 77 ff.

[49] HTR, xxxiii (1940), 189. It should also be noted that in the Jewish calendar Passover and Passion would come on the same day; cf. G. M. Styler in ATR, xxiii (1941), 67 ff.

[50] The Primitive Church (1929), 265 ff.; so P. Corssen in ZNTW, v (1904), 266 ff.

appendix, which mysteriously but undeniably pointed to its apostolic authorship.

And where do we find it? In the Epistula Apostolorum, which Carl Schmidt, its first editor,[51] thinks comes from Asia Minor about 160–170. That it uses the Fourth Gospel is clear: the miracle at Cana (5: 16), the spear wound and the testing of Thomas (11: 24) imply what the explicit quotations of John xiii. 34 (18: 29) and xx. 29 (29: 40) confirm. And it is John's gospel: his name, as in the much later Apostolic Church Order, is given first in a list of all the apostles (2: 13). In spite of occasional gnostic touches, the Epistula may be said to reflect the common Christianity of the late second century, perhaps in Asia.

The case is otherwise with the undeniably gnostic Acta Iohannis, which does not quote from the gospel at all. In his commentary on the gospel Archbishop Bernard brought forward four passages which he claimed prove such use; but Acta 89 is a legend of the docetic Jesus — John, to be sure, reclines on his (sometimes unreal) bosom, but this legend need not come directly from John xiii. 23![52] Acta 97 is closer to Mark xv. 33 and parallels than to John xix. 14; Acta 97 and 101 are closer to the Gospel of Peter 5 (16) than to John xix. 34; and the references to Door and Way, occurring in the gnostic hymn of Acta 95, seem more gnostic than Johannine. The date of the Acta cannot be fixed more exactly than somewhere in the second century,[53] though I should prefer to say late in the century. But does it afford the first example of the complete Johannine legend? "John sailed away to Patmos, where he was deemed worthy to see the revelation of the End. . . . When Trajan was Roman emperor John returned to Ephesus to uphold all the teaching of the church; he told of many things which he remem-

[51] In T.U., xxxiii (1919). Dating it from the Quartodeciman controversy is dangerous because it is not a strikingly tendencious work; but I see little reason to place it so early as 150 (as K. Lake in HTR, xiv (1921), 24). What evidence is there that its author thought the resurrection took place in A.D. 30? It should be noted that some scholars place the Epistula's origin in Egypt (W. H. P. Hatch in HTR, xxi (1928), 152).

[52] It is related in Clement of Alexandria, Adumbratio to I John i. 1 (Gr. Chr. Schr., iii. 210), though possibly second-hand (Hennecke, N.T. Apokr.[2] (1924), 171).

[53] A. von Harnack, Chronologie d. altchristl. Litt., i (1897), 542.

bered the Lord had said to them and what he had spoken to each one. But when he became an old man and gave up the office of bishop in the church, it was committed to Polycarp." [54] Unfortunately most critics regard the first seventeen chapters of the Acta as a very late replacement of the lost beginning; in that case the transfer of the bishopric to Polycarp probably depends on, rather than provides a source for, Tertullian's legend that Polycarp was ordained by John.[55] This, then, is late, and the first orthodox proponent of the whole Johannine legend is Irenaeus.

To be sure, in Asia the gospel was being used. Melito, bishop of Sardis, an ardent Quartodeciman, followed Luke's chronology for the age of Jesus at his baptism but held to the two passovers provided by John.[56] In his Homily on the Passion Melito referred to the four-day burial of Lazarus, called the inscription on the cross a τίτλος, and applied Exodus xii. 46 to the Crucifixion.[57] These points are conclusive, I think, for Melito's use of the gospel.

As for the witness of Claudius Apollinaris, bishop of Hierapolis, his mysterious adversaries, whoever they were, appealed to Matthew to support their non-Quartodeciman views. His statement that they make the gospels seem to disagree does not imply that *they* used the Fourth Gospel; but he himself did, and followed the Johannine chronology against the synoptics.[58]

Probably no orthodox Christian outside Asia accepted the Fourth Gospel at this time, though it is likely that Celsus, whose Ἀληθὴς Λόγος was written against the Christians about 178, had read it.[59] Celsus does not, however, distinguish sharply between the orthodox and the heretics among his adversaries, and his use of the gospel therefore proves nothing either way.[60] It

[54] Acta Iohannis 14 (Bonnet, Acta Apost. Apocr., ii. 1. 159 f.).

[55] De Praesc. Haer., 32; Timothy as first bishop of Ephesus: Fascher in Pauly-Wissowa, RE vi A 1350.

[56] Fragment in Routh, Rel. Sacr., i. 121; Otto, Apol. Rel., ix. 416. Some texts, of course, provide three or four; see Hoskyns, op. cit., i. 206, 291 f.

[57] C. Bonner, The Homily on the Passion by Melito Bishop of Sardis, Studies and Documents, xii (1940), 40.

[58] Routh, Rel. Sacr., i. 160 f.; Otto, ix. 486 f.

[59] Origen, Contra Celsum, ii. 28; ii. 31.

[60] Ibid., vi. 24 ff.; viii. 15 ff.

is probable that his orthodox contemporary Athenagoras, whose Legatio was written about 177, did not receive the gospel, though it must be admitted that his scriptural quotations are too few to be decisive. Athenagoras called himself an Athenian philosopher and Christian, and according to a late tradition to be found in Philip of Side was the first head of the catechetical school at Alexandria. Eusebius does not mention him at all, even though he discusses the school in some detail; [61] but Athenagoras may well have preceded Pantaenus as its head. His teachings were eminently Alexandrine. The Son is in the Father and the Father in the Son; and the Son, the Logos in idea and operation, came forth to be the idea and energizing power of all things. According to, and through, the Logos all things were made (chapter 10). But Athenagoras nowhere quotes the Fourth Gospel. He does not quote the Johannine Epistles. He could hardly be expected to quote the apocalypse! He does, however, use Matthew and Luke, especially the Sermon on the Mount. Like every other non-Asiatic before Irenaeus, he uses synoptic texts and "Johannine" interpretations.

The Acta Iohannis had brought John to Ephesus. It remained for Irenaeus only to identify him with the beloved disciple of the Fourth Gospel, make him the teacher of Polycarp, and have him write the Ephesian Gospel. And why? Because, writing in the next to the last decade of the second century, Irenaeus was eager "to place upon his own brow that crown of apostolic succession at only one remove from the Apostle John which Basilides had claimed through Glaukias from Peter and Valentinus through Theodas from Paul." [62]

Therefore the beloved disciple's gospel had to be supported. "John, the disciple of the Lord, who lay on his breast, himself published the gospel while he was living in Ephesus in Asia." [63] Nothing could be more explicit. But how was this statement to be maintained? There was little or no proof; Papias had ignored the apostolicity of the work, though Irenaeus felt it necessary to call him a hearer of John.[64] "All the presbyters of Asia who conferred with John the disciple of the Lord testify that John

[61] H.E., v. 10.

[62] B. W. Bacon in ZNTW, xxvi (1927), 190.

[63] Irenaeus, iii. 1. 1.

[64] Ibid., v. 33. 4.

delivered it to them; for he continued with them until the times of Trajan." [65] If this refers to Papias, as "presbyters of Asia" usually does in Irenaeus, the testimony must originally refer to some other John; for it is highly probable that in his second book Papias told of John the apostle's martyrdom.[66] Possibly his John, like Polycarp's, was a presbyter of Jerusalem mentioned by Eusebius [67] who died in the eighteenth year of Trajan's reign (A.D. 117).[68] There was another witness, however, one who had not committed much of his teaching to writing. Polycarp's memory had been venerated in Asia since his martyrdom; Rome too had not been unfavorable, for he had attacked Marcion there and had conferred graciously with Anicetus the year before he died. No better authority could be found, and Irenaeus in his youth had himself heard him discussing his teacher: "he would describe his mode of life with John and with the rest who had seen the Lord." [69] To be sure, this John was certainly not the apostle, and was probably the Jerusalem presbyter. But to Irenaeus, defending and transmuting the apostolic faith, such considerations did not have as much weight as "what ought to have been, and therefore was." Polycarp had received the tradition from John. And, according to Irenaeus, he defended this tradition in the presence of Anicetus [70] — but Irenaeus' statement is partly a deduction from his own incorrect theory.

Thus Irenaeus' views of the Fourth Gospel are somewhat tendencious and misleading. H. M. Gwatkin is undoubtedly right in giving as a parallel, "No memory of my own youth stands out more utterly beyond the reach of mistake than the fact that Dr. Butler, and not another, was the teacher of my own old master Kennedy, and this, though Kennedy may not have told us very much about him." [71] Such a statement is surely a credit to Gwatkin but hardly to Irenaeus, as far as the facts of history go. His follower Tertullian becomes more spe-

[65] Ibid., ii. 22. 5.
[66] Philip of Side, Georgios Hamartolos, Mark x. 39, Rev. xi. 8.
[67] H.E., iv. 5. 3.
[68] Epiphanius, Haer., lxvi. 20.
[69] Irenaeus, Letter to Florinus, in H.E., v. 20. 6.
[70] Irenaeus, Letter to Victor, in H.E., v. 24. 16.
[71] In Contemp. Rev., lxxi (1897), 226.

cifically misleading: Polycarp was made bishop of Smyrna by John. Tertullian's old master Irenaeus had said only "by apostles." [72] The Life by Pionius describes only a unanimous election by clergy and laity and ordination by bishops.[73]

Irenaeus was met in his attempt to introduce the now Asiatic gospel by the conservatism of the Roman church. In the East the gospel was valued highly by such heretics as the Valentinians Ptolemaeus and Heracleon,[74] and by Tatian, who had been influenced by the Valentinians and Marcion.[75] The Montanists, too, accepted it: in Montanus, Priscilla, and Maximilla dwelt the Paraclete himself.[76] Their views were millennarian, too; and in the early '80's the unenthusiasm of an influential group in the Roman church for the gospel which the Asiatics were beginning to put forward as apostolic was exceeded only by its distaste for the apocalypse. Gaius of Rome, a presbyter whom Eusebius wrongly dates under Zephyrinus, led the attack.[77]

Proclus the Montanist had claimed succession from Philip the evangelist and his daughters, whose tombs were at Hierapolis in Asia; [78] to this Gaius delivered the smashing reply, "But I can show the trophies of the apostles" — Peter and Paul! [79] To those who upheld the Johannine authorship of the apocalypse he threw back the charge that Cerinthus had forged it.[80] Finally he "curbs the rashness and boldness of his opponents in setting forth καιναὶ γραφαί, new scriptures" — and these include the Fourth Gospel. The whole of Epiphanius' fifty-first chapter against the Alogi, as has been realized since 1865, is based on Hippolytus [81] — who wrote a Defence of the Gospel of John and the Apocalypse against Gaius.[82] And this attack on the Alogi is directed against the very positions Gaius held.

[72] De Praesc. Haer., 32; Irenaeus, iii. 3. 4.
[73] Vita Polycarpi, 22–23.
[74] Hippolytus, Ref. Omn. Haer., vi. 35.
[75] Irenaeus, i. 28. 1.
[76] Hippolytus, Ref. Omn. Haer., viii. 19; Apollinaris in H.E., v. 16. 2.
[77] H.E., ii. 25. 6; his objections are pre-Irenaean (iii. 11. 9).
[78] H.E., iii. 31. 4.
[79] H.E., ii. 25. 7.
[80] H.E., iii. 28. 2.
[81] R. Lipsius, Zur Quellen-Kritik des Epiphanios.
[82] B. W. Bacon, The Fourth Gospel, etc. (1910), 231 ff.

He ascribed both apocalypse and gospel to Cerinthus; so did they.[83] That this view is unreasonable Epiphanius, following Hippolytus, easily perceived. The merely human Jesus of Cerinthus could never be the Incarnate God of the Fourth Gospel.[84] Gaius also maintained that the chronology of John disagreed with the synoptics, especially in regard to the early period of Jesus' ministry. The wedding at Cana was very hard to fit into the synoptic scheme,[85] and John tells of two Passovers while the other gospels speak of one.[86] The Alogi therefore appealed to the synoptics against John. He omits, they said, or cuts or brings in inconsistencies.[87] His work is therefore false and ἀδιάθετον, uncanonical.[88] Gaius and the Alogi (who are probably to be identified [89]) were the staunch upholders of old Roman orthodoxy and its triad of gospels which had weathered the Marcionite controversy but was being found insufficiently explicit for heresy-vexed followers of the Incarnate God.[90]

But Gaius, whom Eusebius calls a very learned man, was not quite the last to uphold old Roman orthodoxy. Though a new day had dawned, and compromise with Asia was essential for the advancement of the catholic church, Victor of Rome was unwilling to admit it. When Polycrates recalled as "great lights" of Asia not only Philip (now become an apostle!) and his daughters but also "John, who lay on the Lord's breast, who became a priest wearing the breast-plate, a witness and teacher . . . who fell asleep in Ephesus," [91] Victor's answer was a prompt excommunication, in the year 193.

Nevertheless the letters of Irenaeus and other bishops urging

[83] Epiphanius, li. 3.

[84] Epiphanius, li. 4.

[85] Epiphanius, li. 18; see the quotations from Barsalîbî in Lawlor-Oulton, Eusebius, H.E., vi. 20. 3. I think it more likely that Gaius rejected the gospel in Dialogue and Kephalaia alike and was not quoted fully by Eusebius than that he accepted it in the Kephalaia.

[86] Epiphanius, li. 22.

[87] Epiphanius, li. 17; 18; 21; H. Windisch, Johannes und die Synoptiker, 4.

[88] Epiphanius, li. 18.

[89] E. Schwartz in Abhandlungen d. K. Ges. d. Wiss. zu Göttingen (phil.-hist. Kl.), N.F., vii. 5, 30 ff.; so A. Jülicher in Pauly-Wissowa, RE, vii. 509 f.; see also J. R. Harris, Hermas in Arcadia (1896), 43 ff.

[90] Epiphanius, li. 12; 18.

[91] Letter to Victor, in H.E., v. 24. 3.

a more tolerant course showed which way the wind was blowing; and though the Valentinian heretic Heracleon commented on the gospel at the end of the century (sometimes with less understanding than his opponent Origen) and was aware that John wrote it,[92] the contemporary Roman canon preserved in the Muratorian fragment accepts the gospel, apocalypse (which it may date early with Epiphanius [= Hippolytus]), and epistles with enthusiasm. Taking a legend of the gospel's origin perhaps from the Acta Iohannis but more probably based upon the gospel's appendix, the canon points out, against Gaius, that the gospels do not disagree: *in omnibus omnia.* The church had spoken; Gaius' defence of an outmoded orthodoxy was henceforth heretical, and the way was opened to the developments of the new century. The Ephesians were once more in the vanguard: Apollonius of Ephesus was quoting the apocalypse with joy. He was relating that tradition — the tradition of Acta Petri cum Simone and Pistis Sophia! — told of the Lord's command to the apostles to remain in Jerusalem for twelve years. And he was describing John's raising a man from the dead at Ephesus — from the Acta Iohannis.[93]

Thus we have followed the strange story of the acceptance of the Fourth Gospel, first in Asia, then with great reluctance at Rome. Walter Bauer points out that just those men whom the church fought — Ptolemaeus, Heracleon, Tatian — prized the book, while Gaius and Roman orthodoxy depended on the synoptic gospels against it.[94] Whether with him we assume that it had a Syrian origin [95] or place its composition in Alexandria or even Asia Minor, it is clear that the gospel was originally not universally accepted in the church. When it was taken up by the influential Irenaeus, and later by Hippolytus, its success was assured. Its final victory, within a very few years, was only a matter of time.

[92] A. E. Brooke, The Fragments of Heracleon, Texts and Studies i. 4 (1891), 55; Origen, In Iohann., vi. 2. See Sir E. Hoskyns, The Fourth Gospel, i. 149.

[93] H.E., v. 18. 4.

[94] W. Bauer, Rechtgläubigkeit und Ketzerei (1934), 210; Ptolemaeus in Irenaeus, i. 8. 5.

[95] Ibid., 96.

II

Why had there been so much difficulty in accepting the gospel? Its divergent chronology could not have been responsible, for it could be harmonized with the synoptics and was apparently understood symbolically even by some of its sponsors.[96] Its Christology was very similar to that of Ignatius, whose orthodoxy even the Roman church never questioned; and the doctrine of the Logos was to be found in Ignatius and the orthodox Justin. Its teaching concerning the sacraments was certainly not heretical, although far from the synoptic view.

Its opponents, however, did not consider its chronology symbolical. The synoptics, they pointed out, told of Jesus' forty days in the wilderness, while John has him call his disciples at once and proceed to the wedding at Cana.[97] The synoptics tell of one Passover; John describes two.[98] And, worst of all, it tells nothing of a miraculous birth, or any birth at all; the wedding at Cana follows too closely the statement about the Logos made flesh.[99] The way was opened, they implied, for a mis-interpretation like that of Marcion's Luke, in which Jesus is not born of a virgin but suddenly appears in Capernaum.[100]

Eucharistic theology, too, demanded a firmer support than could be given by the sixth chapter of John. The other gospels and St. Paul taught that the sacrament had been instituted by Jesus at the Last Supper; and in a situation in which the Eucharist was maintaining and even increasing its importance, this was a vital question. Statements which might be understood symbolically in the East would be taken literally in the West, where there was always a tendency to rigidity. Professor Nock has called it, in contrast to the more flexible Greek view, a "tendency to define, not only *de facto*, but also *de iure*, what is permissible." [101]

It is probable, moreover, that it had been accepted by such

[96] C. C. Richardson in HTR, xxxiii (1940), 184.
[97] Epiphanius, li. 18.
[98] Ibid., li. 22.
[99] Ibid., li. 18.
[100] C. H. Turner in JTS, iii (1901), 117, makes this parallel.
[101] A. D. Nock in HTR, xxxii (1939), 95.

Montanists as Proclus, against whom Gaius wrote.[102] This acceptance would not make it more attractive to Rome, which had been fighting Montanism for many years. And indeed, in the very sphere which most concerned Rome and orthodoxy generally, the Fourth Gospel diverges from the synoptic view. Its doctrine of the church in the highpriestly prayer of chapter xvii is anti-heretical, to be sure, but it makes no place for the apostles and their succession. For it the practical needs of church discipline are irrelevant. Rome could hardly find such a gospel satisfactory until she had consolidated her own gains at the end of the second century. In her conflicts with Montanism she could not accept a gospel which does not provide for the apostolic succession.

In the earliest church the question of apostolic succession had not been important. The apostles were those to whom the risen Lord had appeared, to whom he had given a κλῆσις to the apostolic preaching.[103] That the number of apostles was limited to those appointed by the earthly Jesus is nowhere evident; "the twelve" of I Corinthians xv. 5 are not "all the apostles" of xv. 8; and it is doubtful that originally they were regarded as apostles at all. In the synoptic gospels the word "apostle" appears only in the list of the names of the Twelve — perhaps from a relatively late written source — and in the narrative of their being sent on a somewhat restricted mission, in which the word either has no special meaning or is the equivalent of the Hebrew *shaliach*.[104] Luke uses it otherwise four times,[105] but these passages are all editorial, and the word is not found in the parallels.

In the Fourth Gospel it does not appear at all in its ecclesiastical meaning.[106]

[102] C. H. Turner argued in JTS, iii (1901), 116, that the Alogi were an offshoot of the Montanists; but his testimonies from Epiphanius are not convincing, and the evidence of Irenaeus, iii. 11. 9 does not concern the Montanists (cf. iv. 33. 6), even if the text be read "pseudoprophetae" (a reading Burkitt rejected in CAH, xii. 456 n. 2).

[103] M. Goguel, La Vie de Jésus (1932), 326: Paul would never have argued his apostleship had the earthly Jesus instituted it.

[104] F. Gavin in ATR, ix (1927), 250 ff.

[105] Luke ix. 10, xvii. 5, xxii. 14, xxiv. 10.

[106] John xiii. 16 does not speak of "apostles" but of "sent ones." W. Bauer, Das Johannesevangelium [3] (1933), 170, compares Bereshith rabba 78, where the teaching is

That the Twelve were originally called apostles is very doubtful: only in late editorial passages of Matthew [107] and Luke [108] and in the Apocalypse [109] are these words collocated. Ordinarily in the synoptic gospels they are called the twelve disciples. The number twelve might be only symbolic of the twelve tribes of Israel; but their function is only occasionally that of judging, and St. Paul testifies to their existence in the central part of the Christian tradition.[110]

The most probable view seems to be that the Twelve were among those who became apostles by virtue of a resurrection appearance; and that later they claimed (or had claimed for them) a higher authority because of their early discipleship.

The Fourth Gospel refers to them in only two places.

The confession of Peter in vi. 66–71 is somewhat similar to the confession at Caesarea Philippi in the synoptics; but Goguel and Gardner-Smith agree that it is independent. While Goguel regards it as taken from tradition, Gardner-Smith believes that John composed the discourse himself.[111] And it must be noted that the section is peculiarly parallel to the theological section preceding. I should regard it as among the latest parts of the book.

The awkward phrase "one of the twelve" inserted in the name "Thomas called Didymus" in xx. 24 seems a later addition. In xi. 16 and xxi. 2 it is simply "Thomas called Didymus." The addition seems to be made for the sake of reserving post-resurrection teaching for the Twelve, and it must be later than the story itself.

Since originally, as I have tried to show, the Twelve do not

"The sender is greater than the one sent." Note also Matthew x. 24; Luke vi. 40; the article by Gavin cited in note 104.

[107] Matthew x. 2, a purely editorial remark: "these are the names of the twelve apostles."

[108] Luke vi. 13.

[109] Rev. xxi. 14: "the twelve apostles of the Lamb."

[110] I Corinthians xv. 5.

[111] M. Goguel, op. cit., 368; Gardner-Smith, op. cit., 36. It is of great importance, as R. H. Lightfoot remarks (History and Interpretation in the Gospels (1935), 82), that "in St. John's gospel the church is founded at the first meeting of Jesus with his disciples after the crucifixion, John xx. 19–23."

appear in the Fourth Gospel, and since the word "apostle" in its proper meaning is never to be found there, we may well wonder what provision the author makes for the continuation of the church and the transmission of her teaching and authority. Who are the disciples whom the other gospels would call apostles?

Judas Iscariot is a character absolutely necessary to the coming of the "hour" of Jesus in the divine drama of salvation; he is taken over, of course, from the traditional narrative of the passion; but his motivation is still further simplified. In John xii. 6 he is a thief; in xiii. 2 the devil puts his plan into his heart; in xiii. 27 the devil actively enters into him. Hoskyns remarks that "the case of Judas is . . . typical." [112]

Simon-Cephas-Peter, called and named in John i. 42, seems to be clearly a symbolic character, the chief of the disciples — but perhaps not quite so symbolic as many modern scholars assume. It seems to me that the non-identification of Cephas and Peter in Epistula Apostolorum and the Apostolic Church Order does not prove that they were not different names, one Hebrew, the other Greek, for the same person. The concurrent evidence of Luke xxiv. 34, ἠγέρθη ὁ κύριος καὶ ὤφθη Σίμωνι and I Corinthians xv. 5, ὤφθη Κηφᾷ should be given more weight than the views of frightened opponents of Porphyry.[113] But he acts symbolically in the Fourth Gospel; witness his race with the beloved disciple in chapter xx, and his instructions to "Feed my sheep" in the appendix. He is an example to second century believers, for it was not the Lord himself who called him, but his own brother.

So too Nathanael was called by Philip. He is the only disciple not to have a synoptic prototype, unless his name be regarded as the equivalent of Bartholomew. He represents that small section of Judaism whose eyes are not blinded, whose hearts are not hardened: he is a true Israelite, in whom there is no guile (i. 47). The fact that "tradition preserved a Nathanael legend" [114]

[112] Sir E. Hoskyns, op. cit., ii. 594.

[113] Jerome, Comm. in Gal., i. 2 (Migne, PL, xxvi. 341). On this question see K. Lake in HTR, xiv (1921), 95 ff.; G. La Piana, ibid., 187 ff.; D. W. Riddle in JBL, lix (1940), 169 ff.

[114] M. Dibelius, From Tradition to Gospel (1935), 117.

which is only allusively mentioned here does not contradict the symbolic use of the legend's hero.

Andrew and Philip, who are natives of the "Greek" city of Bethsaida (i. 40, 43), are the disciples through whom the Hellenistic world tentatively approaches the Lord (xii. 20–22); they have Greek names, and it seems probable that Philip is both the disciple of the synoptic gospels and the "Hellenist" deacon of the early tradition in Acts vi. 5. In the Fourth Gospel Andrew transfers his allegiance from the Baptist to the Christ.

Thomas [115] and Judas likewise are to be found in the synoptic lists; but in the tradition almost nothing is known about them, and in late manuscripts their names are exceedingly corrupt.[116] In the Fourth Gospel they do not even receive a call; [117] they suddenly appear as interlocutors in chapter xiv after Thomas has made the appeal of xi. 16: "Let us also go, that we may die with him."

The mysterious "two others" of the appendix (xxi. 2) are probably Andrew and Levi, who appear together in the similar tradition of the Gospel of Peter; and the sons of Zebedee are also abruptly introduced here, undoubtedly for the sake of the apostolic authorship of the gospel.

Thus in the Fourth Gospel the disciples lose all individuality, except as symbols, and act only in reaction to the Incarnate God or to his adversary the devil, the prince of this world. Before the majesty of this drama human nature and historical fact lose their interest. To the author of the appendix, however, history has more meaning, if only as support of contemporary custom and belief. Simon Peter must be more firmly established, perhaps in deference to Roman views, and the "beloved disciple" must be made the drama's author. Another purpose of this appendix, it seems to me, is to provide through its reworking of

[115] K. Lake's argument in Beginnings of Christianity, v (1933), 45 f., that since Thomas like Didymus means "twin" his name can hardly be real, is weakened by the fact that persons named Didymus can be found. See Moulton and Milligan, Vocabulary, *s. v.*

[116] They are equated in the Syriac Doct. Apost., the Curetonian Syriac form of John xiv. 22, and the Syriac appendix to the letters of Jesus and Agbar in H.E., i. 13. 11.

[117] Hoskyns (op. cit., i. 341) adduces xiii. 18, xv. 16, 19 in support of his claim that the call of the Twelve is presumed; but this evidence is weak, and the twelve baskets of vi. 13 only ambiguously assist him.

the fishing scene from synoptic tradition (Luke v. 1–11) a suitable subordination of second century believers to the apostles and their successors. Without the appendix one could never say with Hoskyns that "only after this severe concentration [in xiii–xvii] does the author of the Fourth Gospel permit his readers to occupy their proper position as fish caught by apostolic fishermen and as sheep under the care of an apostolic shepherd." [118] In the gospel proper they are not fish or sheep. By virtue of a resurrection appearance they are spirit-filled believers and disciples (John xx. 21–23).[119]

The identity of the "beloved disciple" is a perennial problem. It cannot be denied that the Asiatic church of the late second century, and probably the author of the appendix, thought he was John the son of Zebedee; but there is no evidence whatever for this view in the gospel itself, where the sons of Zebedee do not appear. Indeed, it might be argued that even in the tradition behind the appendix there were originally only Simon Peter, Thomas Didymus, and Nathanael; then by its author the sons of Zebedee were added, and the "two others" who fill out the mystical number seven. Lietzmann, I am sure, is right in asserting that "the beloved disciple is not an historical character and is not so intended. Rather he is the ideal bearer of the apostolic testimony that flows from the heart of Jesus to those of the hearers." [120]

The Fourth Gospel, therefore, bases its claims essentially on a non-historical, symbolic "beloved disciple." The Christ of the gospel was God Incarnate, but his earthly followers were not necessarily those whose successors were to maintain the church through the ages. The apostles, Ignatius to the contrary, were not the predecessors of the monarchical bishops. The Christ was not the sometime founder of the Petrine succession. "As many as believed on him, to them gave he the right to become children of God, even to them that believe on his name."

[118] Ibid., i. 98.

[119] The date of this appendix is very doubtful, for Irenaeus does not cite it. There is an almost direct quotation of xxi. 20 in Polycrates' letter to Victor (H.E., v. 24. 3). I should not place it before the middle of the second century.

[120] H. Lietzmann, The Beginnings of the Christian Church (Eng. tr. 1937), 311; but this view is greatly weakened if ἀγαπητός means "only" (as C. H. Turner in JTS, xxvii (1926), 113 ff. shows for LXX and Mark).

TWO QUESTIONS RAISED BY WILLIAM JAMES'S ESSAY ON 'THE MORAL EQUIVALENT OF WAR'

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WILLIAM JAMES'S essay on 'The Moral Equivalent of War,' written in 1910, at the end of his life, has received an increasing amount of attention during the last thirty years. This paper would raise two questions about its relation to the main body of James's work. We recall that in the essay James argues for the worthwhileness of the martial virtues in themselves and claims that, since it would in any case be difficult to get rid of them, some way of expressing them in peaceful channels should be found. A few phrases have a peculiarly modern ring. "It would be preposterous," he says, "if the only force that could work ideals of honor and standards of efficiency into English or American natures should be the fear of being killed by the Germans or the Japanese." Instead of military life, a conscription of youth for the battle against nature is therefore recommended. "A permanently successful peace-economy cannot be a simple pleasure-economy. In the more or less socialistic future towards which mankind seems drifting we must still subject ourselves collectively to those severities which answer to our real position upon this only partly hospitable globe. We must make new energies and hardihoods continue the manliness to which the military mind so faithfully clings." James maintains that his plan will accomplish this. To continue in his words: "The military ideals of hardihood and discipline would be wrought into the growing fibre of the people; no one would remain blind, as the luxurious classes now are blind, to man's relations to the globe he lives on, and to the permanently sour and hard foundations of his higher life. To coal and iron mines, to freight trains, to fishing fleets in December, to dishwashing, clothes-washing, and window-washing, to road-building and tunnel-making, to foundries and stoke-holes and to the frames of skyscrapers, would our gilded youths be drafted off, according to their choice, to get the childishness knocked out of them, and to

come back into society with healthier sympathies and soberer ideas."

For the student of James's work as a whole these words raise two questions: First, what changes occur in a biologically oriented pragmatic philosophy when it defends coöperative ideals in this fashion? And second, what happens to a thorough-going individualism when it adopts a position so nearly socialistic?

The crux of the issue lies in the figure used by James to explain what philosophy tries to do. We recall that James came to philosophy as one trained in the biological sciences, and that he effected a major revolution by diverting attention away from the relation of subject and object or knower or known, and toward that of organism and environment. Knowledge, he said, is not so much a problem as a fact. We should ask not the abstract question how knowledge is possible but the concrete question how such knowledge as we have can be improved. Consciousness or the knowing process is an instrument that the organism has developed in its struggle to keep on living. Knowledge is thus what furthers the ends of life. Reality itself is in the making. Truth is what happens to ideas when they accomplish what they set out to do, that is, when they satisfy the impulses that gave rise to them. The whole intellectual process must be evaluated as a part of the larger practical situation where life faces its world and tries to survive.

Whatever else may be said about it, everyone must agree that, after allowance has been made for certain ambiguities, this is an intelligible description of what goes on in the mind, made the more acceptable by the difficulties encountered by other views of truth, such as the coherence and the correspondence theories. The coherence theory explains relations among ideas; it does not explain the connection of ideas with fact. The correspondence theory tries to show how fact is related to idea, but it has not offered a satisfactory description of what "correspondence" really means. James is trying to show that "correspondence" or "agreement with" means taking account of in some observable and practical way. His attempt is successful at least in that it points to purposive elements in the truth situation to which attention must be paid. The question raised

here is whether it has comparable success in its discussion of what constitutes the good. Is the good that which satisfies desire, and if so, what sort of desire? Or is it what promotes survival, and if so whose survival? What kind of ends emerge in a philosophy of this kind? Are the German critics right in calling it a business man's philosophy of cash values, or is James expressing his philosophical as well as personal view when he cries out against "that bitch-goddess, Success" ?

Let us concentrate, as James himself did, on the question of purpose. Notice first of all that James's initial choice of the organism-environment figure on the basis of Darwin's theory of natural selection poses the problem of purpose instead of solving it. The mere fact that organism and environment must work things out together does not explain what kind of purpose is given or whether there is any purpose at all. It is conceivable that the end of all activity on the part of organism and environment, so far as an end can be discerned, might be the sheer maintenance of equilibrium. The sting of Darwin's theory of natural selection lies in its mechanistic implication that any large-scale purpose is ruled out, with the accompanying question whether any purpose at all is left. Organisms in Darwin's theory are either like physical objects, sliding down hill with the plane of the environment, or else like gyroscopes, tipping the other way because of inner complex relations of their own. In both cases they respond mechanistically to their surroundings. Whatever happens is but a matter of give and take where the physical environment first gives life and then takes it, propelling the organism here and there, and finally gathering it to itself when the living energy is spent.

James does not phrase the problem in this way but I think it is not a misunderstanding to say that he recognizes that if purpose is to be a part of the picture it must be introduced either as a new arrival or as a new interpretation of factors already there. This appears to be the reason for his emphasis on the purposive quality of the subjective desires which the organism finds as part of its make-up. When desires appear, says James, purposes come with them, and values announce their presence as well. The interesting point at this stage is how they announce their

presence. If I read James rightly he takes account of desires, purposes, and values through their effectiveness. Like a good pragmatist he calls attention to the fact that things happen which can be accounted for only by such agencies. Desires change things; they determine what shall be; they set in motion processes which affect results.

Now, although it is true that we bring purposes into the picture by noting that desires work effectively for specified ends, it is not clear that we are much nearer a situation that can be called ethical. For if purposes are effective merely on the bodily plane they may represent the push and pull of influences hardly distinguishable from mechanical forces. James claims specifically, however, that some of them are devoted to ideal ends. Yet we must still ask how he distinguishes them as ideal. Much of what he says suggests that purposes are important merely because they do something. The ideal interests are more important than others because there is a finality about their actions. They speak the last word and determine the ultimate outcome. Even God appears to be godlike just because he is a powerful force who works especially hard and rings down the final curtain.

This evaluation of goodness in terms of effectiveness is in line with James's interest in the sheer vigor and ability to maintain themselves shown by emotions and desires. "Take any demand," he says in the essay on 'The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life,' "which any creature, however weak, may make. Ought it not, for its own sole sake, to be satisfied? If not, prove why not. The only possible kind of proof you could adduce would be the exhibition of another creature who should make a demand that ran the other way." And if the two conflict how shall we decide between them? Well, we must establish some kind of working arrangement which gives expression to as many desires as possible.

Does this mean that desires are good as such and as they endure and prevail? I cannot escape the conclusion that James answers both Yes and No. He says Yes when he says, as above, that any desire has a right to be satisfied, and when he talks, as a pragmatist, about letting ideas and preferences fight it out

and appeal to the long run. Yet he definitely says No when he speaks, as he does in other places, about the many values which neither promote the survival of the one who holds them nor are to be judged good because they themselves survive. Such are the joys of contemplation, of aesthetic creation, and of mystical ecstasy, and also the heroic response to the call of danger. These simply do not yield to the requirement that each value shall show pragmatic usefulness or fit into a survival ethic. Indeed survival itself is worth struggling for chiefly so that these experiences may be had. In the place of survival-value, richness is thus introduced as a mark of worth. But here the plot thickens, for with richness or variety comes a seriously complicating factor against which James does not appear to make special provision. Some experiences, such as the contemplative, for example, are good in their own immediacy. James argues this case strongly and with many illustrations, — witness his stress on the unassailability of the mystic's private insights, on the importance of all percepts as opposed to concepts, and on the significance of immediate intuitive awareness whether the object be outer stimulus or inner state. These experiences are intrinsically good and so are their objects. This means, — does it not? — that they are independent of relations with other states and objects. If they conflict how, then, shall we decide among their claims? Have we recourse to anything but competition and survival? On the basis so far offered what decides between the joy of drunkenness and that of religion but the ability of one or the other to survive? Yet it is not conceivable that a drunkard might outlive say, a Dunkard?

Try as we will to escape it, this question of what outlives the other or prevails over it or maintains itself against all comers seems always to crop up in our discussions of what is good. It is true that James aims at a democracy or union of desires rather than anarchy but it is not clear how he attains his aim or that the issue is actually settled, since, both at the end and the beginning, worth really depends on what the individual wants.

Let us consider this a little further. As his philosophy progresses it would seem that James modifies the notion of survival

in two important ways and the organism-environment figure in at least one way.

As to survival, first of all James obviously means group survival in most cases rather than individual survival, though there are places where the latter is important also. But in so far as the end is group survival is the ethic truly a survival ethic? If a man works and dies, for example, to insure the survival of his group is he animated by survival instincts or competitive motives? James is not the only ethical philosopher to be bothered by this problem. The common way to solve it is to say that the man has identified his own good with the good of his group so that he is really working for himself all the time. But surely we should emphasize the discontinuity here and say that to work for one's self and to die for one's friends are different forms of activity from the ethical point of view. James appears to emphasize the continuity in order to keep his original premises. Of course he pleads for the higher choice. He wants heroism, sacrifice, love, devotion to the ideal, and he refers to the more "massive" destiny, or survival on the larger scale. But it is a question whether these ends mean the same thing as the survival of the individual.

Second, James talks of the survival of ideas and purposes and causes irrespective of the individual lives of their bearers, though as a good empiricist he would of course never allow us to abstract them from any and all bearers and experiencers. But once again the metaphor of the biological organism wresting his living from his environment does not seem to fit the case.

Third, we thus become aware of the fact that in the course of the discussion the organism-environment figure has changed its character. The organism, it appears, has two aspects or two sets of functions: one biological, acquisitive, competitive, the other spiritual, reflective, appreciative. It lives, also, in at least two kinds of environment: one is physical, offering food and shelter which must be fought for competitively, the other is the spiritual world of ideas, purposes, and causes which exist to be shared rather than divided up, and are not eliminated but enhanced by being possessed. This makes the notion of survival more ambiguous than ever just as it makes that of adjustment

to environment very unclear. As an animal or bodily organism man adjusts his physical environment to his needs. As a reflective human being he adjusts himself appreciatively to the needs of his fellows and to the world of ideas and bows to the will of God not because of its physical necessities but through his recognition of its intrinsic worth.

The question, then, comes down to this. The physical environment has gone except as a basis for what completely transcends it in significance. The acquisitive and competitive desires have gone, the biological instincts have lost their importance, the organism has sloughed off its egoistic will to conquer and become a critical and appreciative mind. Meanwhile survival has separated itself from the individual as such and attached itself to groups, causes, and ideas, and even here has begun to pale in the presence of the notion of intrinsic worth. What then has happened to survival as a criterion? Is there any point in keeping it at all?

The interesting fact is that, if I read him rightly, James does keep it to the end and makes it one of the main props of the pragmatic position. After all, the truth is what works, and although we modify the meaning of "working," and pare away its crudeness by explaining that the work must be intellectual and spiritual, still we cannot dodge the fact that truth is ultimately practical and that "practical," as James ordinarily employs the term, means useful for the accomplishment of desire. Further, as long as we retain the biological figure, the basic desire, of which others are sublimations, is for survival. Again, when he discusses values, James says explicitly that when they conflict all they can do is fight it out on the chessboard of life. And while he would undoubtedly maintain that one way of fighting it out is to appeal in the case of ideas to argument, which means to reason, yet I do not think that he ever gets rid of the notion that we make such an appeal because it is useful rather than because it is reasonable in the sense of conformable to critically established ends. The answer lies in the future, he says, whereas a thorough-going belief in reason as having standards in its own right would hold that the answer may also be right here in the present so far as reason can be invoked. James

does appeal to such tests as pungency, massiveness, or haunting quality, but these again are based on the power to endure. What really decides both truth and worth is lastingness and we are not told just what lastingness means. Of course as a spiritually minded man James does not really want to say that goodness is determined by lasting quality. The true James comes out in the remark made about immortality that he believed more in immortality as he grew older because he felt he was growing more fit to live. But as a philosopher he says much that points the other way.

Returning now to the argument of 'The Moral Equivalent of War' we find that it throws light on our problem in three ways. In the first place it discusses ideal values, and by no gesture, sign, or hint intimates that they must meet the test of survival. In fact heroism, one of its ideals, is named as a quality that may prevent the survival of the one who has it. What is truly good, James says, is not the coöperative life with ease, or the heroic life with war, but the coöperative life with heroism. Life is worth while if it is coöperative and heroic at the same time. So far as I can see James simply sets these qualities up as ideals and asks if we do not accept them intuitively just as he does. This is in line, I think, with his frequent assertion that each of us brings his values to the evolutionary conflict and tries to make them survive. We add our push to what we know to be right, which suggests that we know now what is right and do not wait for the future.

Second, this essay changes the organism-environment figure by specifying different types of environment. Instead of dealing merely with a physical environment we have in addition an economic environment which can be modified so as to develop our own moral qualities. To change from a competitive to a coöperative social milieu will be to change our moral life.

Third, the essay explicitly recognizes that the organism is responsive to spiritual values and can cultivate them in its own life. The materialistic taint attaching to the animal organism that fights for food in a physical world has gone. It is no longer a question of chemical response to physical stimulus, or of behavioristic reaction to the pull of mechanical forces, but of

sensitive awareness on the part of the critical mind to goods recognized as intrinsic. As James remarks elsewhere, these appear in their immediate luminousness, their philosophical reasonableness, and their moral helpfulness. Only the last of these is pragmatic and even here the helpfulness is "moral."

James therefore actually gives us a philosophy which continually strains at its tether and overreaches its acknowledged presuppositions. It professes empiricism and pragmatism. Before it is done these terms are stretched so far as to be hardly recognizable. It uses biological figures and appeals to the competitive tests of evolution. Yet it exposes the inadequacy of its chosen instruments as it proceeds.

A second illustration from 'The Moral Equivalent of War' shows in another way how far James passes beyond his original point of view. We look upon James as one of the last of the great individualists of the nineteenth century. He was, as he says himself, against bigness in all its forms, against all standardization, all tyranny and all infringements of individual liberty. He knew that other men had "insides of their own," and the right to develop their own ideas in their own way. His use of the evolutionary competitive figure was itself, of course, a sign of his individualistic interest.

Yet in 'The Moral Equivalent of War' he comes pretty near to being a socialist. He begins to take account of the idea, driven home to all of us so powerfully since 1914, that social forces and the conditions of social living where, for example, a powerful few can manipulate the lives of the many, frequently determine the ethical situation we confront as individuals. We know that James rejoiced so whole-heartedly in the heroic and combative virtues that he tried to make them more effective in the intellectual life, changing the search for truth from a sedentary to an aggressive, experimental occupation which enlisted the more active energies. So fond was he of the feeling of vitality and the glow of abounding health that he might well have joined up with Nietzsche in praising strength for its own sake and finding virtue in the fight which makes more and more demands on strength. But war is too atrocious. Is war necessary, then, James asks, for heroism? Not at all. We can keep the

heroism and keep the peace at the same time by having men fight coöperatively against physical nature. The more he thought of this the more James seems to have been appealed to by the idea that labor for society has its own value and that satisfaction of the demands of the individual is only one element in the determination of good. So he writes in this essay: "All the qualities of a man acquire dignity when he knows that the service of the collectivity that owns him needs them."

In other words James says in the first place, change your economic environment from one that is competitive to one that is coöperative and you will change men's moral capacities. You will educate men ethically for you will stimulate their social instincts at the expense of those that are selfish. In this way you will force the evolutionary process to turn a corner. Men will begin to compete for the social good instead of for private gain. You will keep your energies but you will direct them toward constructive ends. Further you will release new energies since men's qualities acquire "new dignity" in "the service of the collectivity." In this way men can outgrow individualism and find worth in the distinctively social. Obviously this is not a glorification of the state as such. The state is too limited an institution to be the bearer of the values James has in mind. It is the dedication of the self to society as a whole that James wants us to achieve. Even though we grant that society as a whole is an abstraction with which James would not allow us to dally too long, and that it means nothing except in terms of the experiences of the individual members, we still have, it seems to me, an escape from individualism comparable to the escape from evolutionary naturalism noticed before.

In other words, neither an evolutionary nor an individualistic philosophy can offer an appropriate framework for James's own spiritual insights. For we must ask him, in the first case: Do you draw your standards from the evolutionary process and what survives in it, or from that which has a vantage point outside evolution and judges it? In the second case we ask: Do you determine value by capacity to satisfy individual demands? Even if you say that the aim is to satisfy the demands of as many individuals as possible have you not introduced the no-

tion of justice and therefore left sheer individualism behind? Further, we must observe that the real James comes out in a passing remark in one of the essays to the effect that the happiness of a large number at the expense of one lonely tortured soul would be intolerable. In other words, quality counts; it is the reflection of the discriminating mind upon the total situation that determines value.

I have said that James's philosophy seems to overreach its own self-imposed restrictions. My final question is whether this does not come partly from the excesses of his revolt against an abstract rationalism and from a certain vacillation in his efforts to find substitutes for it. Where, in James's philosophy is the ultimate sanction for what is good? There are at least three possible answers. In the last chapter of The Principles of Psychology he seems to appeal to origin in our own bodily structure. We are so constituted physiologically, for example, as to want order. That is why order is a good thing. On the other hand, pragmatism as a philosophy obviously appeals less to beginnings than to endings. The good is what results, what works well, what has the most massive destiny. Yet we neglect a very characteristic strain in James if we fail to notice the importance of the moment of ecstasy, the perceptual flash of recognition, the immediate awareness of an essential rightness of quality.

These three must be reconciled. The question is whether James gives us an adequate basis for reconciliation. It is possible to say that our brain-born desires start us on the quest for good, that as we pursue the quest we test our goods by their results, and that our awareness of the goodness of the results comes itself in a flash of immediacy which confirms our sense of worth. But do we not best explain this sequence of experiences by appealing to a rational principle of coherence which we employ all along the way?

Here of course we approach the rock where the two main streams of philosophy divide. One says that nature, life, experience accounts for all, the other that mind, reason, or spirit must be invoked. Philosophers seem to be unable to phrase the issue in such a way as to make agreement possible. Our question then really comes down to this. Where is James's principle of

exclusion? His overflowing generosity makes him the great apostle of tolerance and inclusiveness. He called for a pluralistic richness in which every individual and every desire should feel at home and have a right to express itself. But could he not have kept both the richness and the inclusiveness by invoking a principle of coherence which would distinguish more clearly between license and freedom? What we need, it would seem, is a philosophy that can be reasonably critical without being wooden or blind, a philosophy that can avoid what James calls the priggishness of Hegelianism and at the same time introduce rational standards of discrimination. It must be flexible enough to take account of growth but able to measure its growth by a criterion that has permanence.

One feels at times that with James as with Socrates the purity of the personal life obscured certain philosophical difficulties. Socrates taught that to know what is good is to do it, since for his own well-organized character that was the case. James was willing to let events work themselves out in the long run because his personal confidence in the right and his belief in his fellow men led him to think that the long run would inevitably be a good run. What would survive was not different from what should survive. His own aims were so high and his energies so lively that the distinction between natural and rational tended to disappear.

Thus it is that even when we accuse James of blindness or inconsistency we are forced at once to add that it is the blindness of love or the inconsistency of a mind that is not afraid to grow. Of him we can only say, paraphrasing his own words on Thomas Davidson, that many might crave inconsistency for themselves if they could have it on such a scale. We have remarked that James's thought stretches itself until it overreaches its original presuppositions and appears to gain power as it does so. With him as with many other outstanding thinkers we have the paradox of a philosopher whose best ideas frequently lie outside or on the periphery of his formal system yet who presumably would not have won these peripheral and independent insights had he not striven mightily to remain within his original presuppositions. Thought appears to develop best when living in-

sights expand beyond the limits of the structure built to contain them and strain it so much that a new structure must be built.

James left us little in the way of formal definitions of truth and this may be an element in his power. We have enough of such definitions spotting the pages of our textbooks, — catalogued and pigeonholed and waiting to be memorized by the next generation of students. Instead of a stereotyped formula James bequeathed to us a vivid realization of the need for eternal vigilance and continuous growing perceptiveness if we are to have any hope of reaching the truth. He believed that the good life was one of unceasing struggle to pass beyond present attainment. May we win some of his confidence that the struggle is itself worth while even in its darkest hours.

PHILO ON FREE WILL *

And the Historical Influence of His View

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In Philo, as in any other philosopher, the problem of the freedom of the will in man is but a special phase of the more general problems of the existence of immutable laws in nature and the relation of mind to body. Now with regard to laws of nature Philo's view is clear. There are, according to him, certain unalterable laws by which the universe is governed, but these laws were established in the universe by God at the time of its creation. This view is expressed by him in a variety of ways in such statements as that there are "ordinances and laws which God laid down in the universe as unalterable" [1] and that "this world is the Megalopolis and it has a single polity and a single law." [2] These laws of nature are sometimes designated by him in their totality by the general term Logos, by which he means an immanent Logos in the created physical universe, conceiving of it as part of that incorporeal Logos which existed prior to the creation of the universe. It is this immanent Logos which is described by him as "the bond of all existence," which "holds and knits together all the parts" [3] and which also "administers all things." [4]

Equally clear is his view with regard to the relation of mind to body. Man is a miniature world [5] and, like the great world which consists of a body and a Logos within it, man consists of

* As one of six chapters on Philo in a larger work dealing with the history of an integrated group of philosophic problems from Plato to Spinoza, this paper contains certain assertive generalizations on debatable points which are discussed in other parts of the work.

[1] Op. Mundi 19, 61. (Quotations from Philo in this paper are from Colson and Whitaker's translation of his works in the Loeb Classical Library.)

[2] Jos. 6, 29.

[3] Fug. 20, 112.

[4] Quis rer. div. her. 38, 188.

[5] The analogy of man to the world as a microcosm to a macrocosm is implied in Philo's reference to the world as the "greatest and most perfect man" in Migr. Abr. 39, 220. Cf. Drummond, Philo Judaeus II, 65, and II, 3. On this analogy, see Plato, Tim. 30 D; 44 D; Aristotle, Phys. VIII, 2, 252b, 26–27.

body and mind, and this mind within the body is, according to Philo, like the immanent Logos in the world, a part of the incorporeal Logos which existed prior to the creation of the world. Thus in one passage, after having referred to the preexistent Logos and the Logos in man as two Logoi, "one the archetypal Logos above us, the other the copy of it which we possess," [6] he describes these two Logoi as "the mind within us and the mind above us." [7] Like the immanent Logos in the world, this immanent Logos in man is that which constitutes the principle of order and harmony and purposive rational action in man. In its relation to the powers of the irrational soul the mind is like a king in a state; it governs and unifies all these powers, which form its bodyguard, as it were, and accompany it as an escort.[8]

Throughout the philosophy of Philo, however, there is the implicit assumption of a fundamental difference between the rule of the immanent Logos in the world and its rule in man. In the world there is only a body which the Logos encounters, a body whose basis is a chaotic, discordant and errant matter, and no sooner is that Logos placed in the world than it subdues that matter, controls its errancy and establishes its governance of law and reason and orderly processes in the world. In the human body, however, it is not only an errant matter which the Logos encounters but also another soul which was created by God when He formed man "out of the matter scattered here and there, which Moses calls clay" [9] and that soul, too, which he calls earthlike (γεώδης),[10] is made of matter. Being made of matter, it is errant, disorderly and irrational; but more than mere body, it is a force; it is active in its errancy and not merely passive; it is not easily overcome by the immanent reason; it offers resistance to it, with the result that in man throughout his lifetime there is a struggle between the rational and irrational souls.

This struggle of the rational soul with the body under the dominance of the irrational soul is described by Philo with striking clearness in many characteristic passages. "In so far

[6] Quis rer. div. her. 48, 230 and cf. 233. [7] Ibid., 236.
[8] Migr. Abr. 31, 170. [9] Leg. All. I, 12, 31. [10] Ibid., 32.

as the soul of the wise man," he says, "descending from the aether above, comes down upon and enters a mortal and is sown in the field of the body, it is truly sojourning in a land which is not its own." [11] The body under the dominance of the irrational soul not only fails to coöperate with the rational soul but is an "actual hindrance" to it [12] and is "a plotter" against it.[13] The passions which arise in the body, though when mastered by reason they may become our helpers, are in reality "our actual foes," [14] so that we are constantly afflicted from within by "pleasures and desires and sorrows and fears." [15] The outcome of that conflict is uncertain. Sometimes it is the victory of reason, in which case the resulting action is described by such terms, borrowed from both philosophy and Scripture, as goodness, virtue, wisdom and righteousness [16] and the agent is described as good, wise and righteous.[17] Sometimes, however, the outcome of the conflict is a victory for the passions, in which case the resulting action is described as wickedness or impiety or sin [18] and the agent is described as foolish or wicked or sinful.[19]

So far Philo's position with regard to the action of the immanent Logos in the world and in man is like that of Plato as portrayed in the Timaeus. For though Philo's immanent Logos, which God implanted in the world at the time of its creation to serve as its governing law, in so far as the use as well as the description of the term Logos is concerned, was undoubtedly borrowed from the Stoic vocabulary, it is essentially the same as the Platonic universal soul. The universal soul of Plato, exactly like the immanent Logos of Philo, was made by God "earlier and elder than the body." [20] It was set by God "in the midst" of the world and was spread "through all its body." [21] Its purpose was to act as the "mistress and gover-

[11] Quaest. in Gen. III, 10; cf. Quis rer. div. her. 54, 267.

[12] Leg. All. I, 32, 103.

[13] Ibid., III, 22, 69.

[14] Ibid., II, 4, 10.

[15] Quaest. in Gen. III, 10.

[16] *τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἡ ἀρετή, τὸ σοφόν, σοφία, δικαιοσύνη.* See Leisegang. Indices ad Philonis Alexandrini Opera, s.v.

[17] *ἀγαθός, σοφός, δίκαιος.* See ibid., s.v.

[18] *τὸ κακόν, ἡ κακία, ἀσέβεια, ἁμάρτημα.* See ibid., s.v.

[19] *φαῦλος, κακός, ἀσεβής, ὑπαίτιος.* See ibid., s.v.

[20] Tim. 34 C. (quoted from various translations).

[21] Ibid., 34 B.

nor" of the world [22] and that purpose was actually attained, for when the world was created out of matter, called also necessity, and within that world the universal soul or mind was placed, "mind overruled necessity" and "this universe was fashioned in the beginning by the victory of reasonable persuasion over necessity" [23] and the soul of the universe, which contained mind and was rational, "began a divine beginning of unceasing and intelligent life lasting throughout all time." [24] Similarly Philo's description of the two souls in man, the rational and the irrational, and the conflict between them, though containing elements from other dialogues of Plato as well as from other non-Platonic sources, is essentially based upon Plato's description in the Timaeus of the rational and irrational souls,[25] of the conflict between them [26] and of the possible victory of the rational soul over the irrational soul by the strength which it may gain through knowledge acquired by means of training.[27]

But as we go on and scrutinize further their respective statements with regard to the victory of the rational or of the irrational soul, we discover some difference between their views. In Plato, we get the definite impression that the victory of reason over the passions, or its defeat by them, depends entirely upon the relative strength or weakness of these two contestants. Given a mind which for some reason or other has failed to re-educate itself in the knowledge of true being which it had forgotten on its entrance into the body, and given at the same time a body of which for some reason or other the passions are strong and powerful, the victory of body over mind is definitely assured and nothing in the world could change it, unless it were some external causes which happened to weaken the power of the passions or to strengthen the power of the mind. If, therefore, we had a gauge by which we could measure the relative strength or weakness of mind and body, we could at any given moment predict the outcome of the conflict between them. Hence it is the possession of knowledge or the lack of it that automatically will lead to the victory of the rational or the

[22] Tim. 34 C.
[23] Ibid., 48 A.
[24] Ibid., 36 E.
[25] Ibid., 42 E ff.; 69 C.
[26] Ibid., 42 E–44 D.
[27] Ibid., 86 B–87 B.

irrational soul. There is no such third factor as a will, conceived as something autonomous and as something which is free and independent of both the rational and irrational faculties of the soul and which by some arbitrary action tips the scale on the side of the one or the other. Whenever the rational and irrational souls meet in conflict, the victory of the one or the other will be decided on the basis of their respective strengths and weaknesses. For man there is no choice in the matter. Indeed Plato speaks of a distinction between voluntary (ἑκούσια) wrong-doings and involuntary (ἀκούσια) wrong-doings [28] as well as of a distinction between a voluntary lie and an involuntary lie.[29] But when we examine the sense in which Plato uses the term 'voluntary,' we shall find that there is no indication that he meant thereby the existence of a will which is free and independent of reason and concupiscence. The term 'voluntary,' we shall find, is used by him here in two senses: (1) in the sense of not being compelled by some external agent,[30] and (2) in the sense of knowing what one does, for in the case of a lie he explicitly says that an involuntary lie is one that is told through ignorance (ἀμαθία).[31] Accordingly voluntary lying and voluntary wrong-doing mean only lying and doing wrong without external compulsion and with full knowledge of the act. It is in this sense of 'knowingly' that Plato uses the term 'voluntarily' in his statement that "no one is voluntarily (ἑκὼν) wicked." [32] By knowledge, according to him, the mind is strengthened in its struggle with the passions of the body and automatically overcomes them.

In Philo, however, we get the impression that the victory of the rational or of the irrational soul is not decided mechanically by their respective strengths. There is to him a will in man which by some unaccountable manner may decide in favor of the one or the other, even when by all the laws of causality the

[28] Legg. IX, 861 B.

[29] Ibid., V, 730 C; Rep. VI, 533 E.

[30] Polit. 293 A.

[31] Rep. VII, 535 E. It is interesting to note that the Hebrew *shegagah*, which, according to rabbinic interpretation, means the commission of a sin through ignorance, is translated in the Septuagint by ἀκούσιον (Lev. 4, 2; Num. 35, 11 et passim).

[32] Tim. 86 E. Cf. discussion in commentaries of R. D. Archer-Hind, A. E. Taylor and F. M. Cornford, ad loc.

outcome should have been otherwise. We get this impression from the particular terms which he uses in his description of virtue and vice, which, as we have seen, he also calls righteousness and sin.

Sin, says Philo, may be committed either voluntarily (ἑκουσίως) or involuntarily (ἀκουσίῳ).[33] Now with regard to voluntary sin, he explicitly says that the sinner in question cannot say that the sin he has committed was "according to God's will (κατὰ θεόν)." [34] Voluntary sins, according to him, have their sole source in the sinner himself, or, to use his own words, "they are acts of our own will (γνώμης)." [35] With regard to involuntary sin, however, he says in effect that it may be considered as proceeding indirectly from God. The involuntary sinner, according to him, is one whose past life is not altogether stainless but who somewhere in his past must have committed certain sins, though sins which are few in number and which can be easily remedied.[36] A man with such a past is chosen by God as an instrument of His judgment in inflicting punishment upon some more grievously guilty person,[37] who somehow has escaped from the justice of men,[38] and whom God, after His manner of not inflicting evil directly, wishes to punish through the instrumentality of some intermediary agent.[39] In being chosen, on his past record, by God as an instrument of carrying out His divine judgment, man thus happens to commit what is known as involuntary sin, for which, incidentally, he receives a light punishment and thus expiates the few and remediable sins of his past.[40] The act committed by the involuntary sinner is

[33] Fug. 14, 76.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid., 13, 65.
[36] Spec. Leg. III, 21, 122.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid., 121.
[39] Fug. 13, 66.

[40] This analysis of Philo's view as to the cause of involuntary sin is based upon passages in Spec. Leg. III, 21, 120–123, and Fug. 13, 65–14, 76. In both these places Philo discusses Ex. 21, 13, which in the Septuagint reads: "If he did not do it voluntarily, but God delivered into his hands, I will appoint thee a place whither he who hath killed shall flee." Evidently following what in his time must have already been a Jewish tradition, which we shall quote at the end of this note, Philo takes this verse to refer to a case where A, who was a guilty person deserving of punishment (Spec. Leg. III, 21, 120–121), was killed unintentionally by B, who in the past had committed a few remediable sins (ibid., 122). His comment on this verse is as follows: "The writer feels that intentional acts are acts of our own will, and that unintentional acts are acts

therefore an act of God's will, but the purpose of that act as intended by God was not to have the man commit a sin, but only to carry out His divine judgment in punishing sinners. Had the man's past record been stainless and free of any voluntary sin, God would not have chosen him as the instrument of His judgment. Involuntary sin may therefore be said to have its source in man's voluntary sins.

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of God's will (*θεοῦ*): I mean not sins, but, on the contrary, all acts that are a punishment for sin" (Fug. 13, 65). What he means to say, I take it, is this: B's unintentional killing of A has a double aspect: (1) as a deserved punishment of A; (2) as a sin committed by B. With reference to the first of these two phases, Philo says that it is "of God's will," because, as he says subsequently, God has chosen B as the minister of His judgment and the instrument of His vengeance upon A, in view of the fact that God does not inflict punishment directly (Fug. 13, 66; Spec. Leg. III, 21, 121–122). With reference to the second phase, he says that it is not "of God's will," for while God has chosen B as the instrument of His vengeance upon A, He did not choose him directly for the purpose of committing an unintentional sin. Later in Fug. 14, 76, Philo says: "It is lawful, therefore, for one who feels that he has fallen into an unintentional offence, to say that the offence is according to God's will (*κατὰ θεόν*)." This does not mean that B is allowed to say that God has caused him to sin; it only means that he is allowed to say that he sinned because God had chosen him as an instrument of His judgment. This removes the seeming inconsistency which Colson (Philo, Vol. V, p. 45, n. c) finds in Fug. § 65 and § 76. Though this discussion of Philo deals primarily with the particular case of murder, his introductory statement in Fug. 13, 65, "The writer feels that intentional acts are acts of our own will, and that unintentional acts are God's acts," as well as his succeeding discussion, quite clearly shows that he tries to draw from it a generalization with regard to all human actions.

The Jewish traditional interpretation of Lev. 21, 13, referred to above (quoted by Ritter, Philo und die Halacha: Eine vergleichende Studie, p. 30, n. 3, and referred to by Heinemann, Philons griechische und jüdische Bildung, pp. 400 f.), is reported in the name of Simeon b. Lakish, a Palestinian Amora of the third century. It reads as follows: "What case does the verse deal with? It deals with the case of two persons who killed human beings, one of them unintentionally and the other intentionally, but neither of them committed his act in the presence of witnesses who could come and testify against him. The Holy One, blessed be He, therefore, causes them to meet at the same inn. The one who has killed intentionally seats himself under a ladder and the other who has killed unintentionally begins to climb that ladder and falls down upon the one who sits underneath it and kills him. The result is that he who has killed intentionally suffers punishment by death and he who has killed unintentionally suffers punishment by exile" (Makkot 10b).

Though the homily quoted is that of an Amora, it is based on an older Tannaitic homily in Mekilta on Ex. 21, 13 (ed. Weiss, p. 86a; ed Friedmann, p. 80a). The sentiment expressed in it is also found in another Tannaitic homily on Deut. 22, 8: "When thou buildest a new house, then thou shalt make a parapet for thy roof, that thou bring not blood upon thine house, if any man fall from thence." Upon the last statement, which literally reads "if any *one falling* fall from thence," the school of Ishmael com-

No distinction is made by Philo between voluntary virtue and involuntary virtue, and this for the very good reason that, like Aristotle,[41] he defines virtue, or rather righteousness (δικαιοσύνη), as an act performed by voluntary choice (ἑκουσίῳ γνώμῃ),[42] and consequently no virtue can be described as involuntary. But as for the voluntariness of righteousness or virtue, it is to be presumed that like the voluntariness of wickedness it is an act "of our own will." But still he does not say of it as he does of voluntary wickedness that it is not "according to God's will (κατὰ θεόν)." Whether this omission implies that God has some share in man's choice of good, despite its being a voluntary act, is a question which we shall discuss later. Certain it is, however, that in the choice of good, no less than in the choice of evil, man can exercise his freedom of will, for, as he says: "And mark, the words in which thy Father urges thee to go *put no compulsion on thee*, in order that thou mayest follow the better course at thine own volition (ἐθελουργός) and by thine own self-determination (αὐτοκέλευστος)." [43]

One gets the impression that Philo's purpose in these passages is to convey the idea that volitional acts are absolutely of man's own free choice, and not only are they not determined by God directly but they are also not determined by any of the natural causes through which God effects His purpose in the universe.

It is not, however, the mere use of terms from which we derive this distinction between Plato and Philo as to the freedom of the will. It is based upon the more firm foundation of a difference in their conception of the causality of God and His power over the laws which He has implanted in nature. Both of them, as we have seen, believe that there are unalterable laws of

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ment as follows: "that man was destined to fall since the six days of creation, seeing that he has not yet fallen and yet Scripture describes him as '*falling*'; this in truth is in accordance with the principle that reward is brought about through the agency of a worthy person and punishment is brought about through the agency of a guilty person" (Sifre on Deut. 22, 8 (ed. Friedmann, § 229); Shabbat 32a). The same interpretation of the verse is also implied in pseudo-Jonathan Targum ad loc.

[41] Eth. Nic. II, 6, 1106b, 36, where virtue is defined ἕξις προαιρετική, and III, 2, 1111b, 7, where προαίρεσις is said to be ἑκούσιον.

[42] Somn. II, 26, 174.

[43] Quod det. pot. ins. 4, 11.

nature, and both of them also believe that these laws of nature were implanted by God in the universe as an act of good will. But there is a difference between them as to the power of God over these laws of nature. To Plato, once the laws of nature were implanted by God in the world, by His implanting in it the universal soul, these laws can never be upset. Indeed God, who has created the universe and has implanted the laws of nature within it, should logically be able also to dissolve them; still, to dissolve that which He has perfectly constructed, argues Plato, would indicate "the will of an evil one," and since the Demiurge is not an evil one, he assures the created Gods, i.e., the celestial bodies and the deities of popular religion, that "in my will (*βούλησις*) ye possess a bond greater and more sovereign than the bonds wherewith, at your birth, ye were bound together." [44] What he really means to say is that on the creation of the world and the implantation of the laws of nature within it God abdicated His power to upset these laws and gave His assurance, as it were, that He would let the world run according to its established laws without any interference on His part. It is like the covenant which the God of the Hebrew Scripture established between Him and "every living creature of all flesh" that is upon the earth, at the conclusion of the deluge, an everlasting covenant, by which God gave assurance that "while the earth remaineth, seedtime and harvest, and cold and heat, and summer and winter, and day and night shall not cease and that neither will He again smite any more everything living, as He has done." [45] But while the God of the Hebrew Scripture, despite the covenant, has still reserved for himself, mentally, the right to upset the order of nature temporarily for the sake of performing miracles whenever there should be a need for them, the Demiurge of Plato had made no such mental reservation. There is no room for miracles in the philosophy of Plato. His God, though He has started as a free agent and created the world by will,[46] by His own voluntary abdication of His power to change the laws which He himself

[44] Tim. 41 A–C.
[45] Gen. 8, 21–22; 9, 16–17. Cf. also Jer. 31, 34–35; 33, 20–21.
[46] Tim. 29 D–E; 41 A–B.

has implanted in the world, has deprived himself of freedom and thereafter acted by the necessity of His own nature no less than the God of Aristotle who never created a world by his will.

In the philosophy of Philo, however, there is room for miracles, for while his God is philosophically the Demiurge of Plato, He has still retained the essential characteristics of the miracle-working Jehovah of the Hebrew Scripture. Believing as he did in the historicity of the miracles recorded in Scripture, he held that God may change the order of natural events when it serves some good purpose. He thus describes in great detail as historical events the miracles wrought by Moses in Egypt before the exodus of the children of Israel and in the wilderness after their exodus.[47] Of these miracles some were performed through intermediary agents, either by Aaron or by Moses or by both, while others, namely, swarms of flies, murrain and the destruction of the first-born, were performed, according to him, directly by God himself without any intermediary agency.[48] What miracles are and for what purpose they are wrought may be gathered from the words he puts in the mouth of Moses when addressing the people before their miraculous crossing of the Red Sea: "Do not lose heart. God's way of defence is not as that of men. Why are you quick to trust in the probable and the likely and that only? When God gives help He needs no armament. It is His special property to find a way where no way is. What is impossible to all created being is possible to Him only, ready to His hand."[49] Miracles accordingly are

[47] Vit. Mos. I, 12, 65 ff.; Migr. Abr. 15, 83 ff.

[48] Vit. Mos. I, 17, 97; 23, 130–24, 139. So also in the Jerusalem Talmud (Sanhedrin II, 1, 20a) one of the plagues from among this last-mentioned class, namely, the destruction of the first-born, is said to have been inflicted directly by God. A fourfold classification of the ten plagues found in Shibbole ha-Leḳet (ed. Buber, p. 194, referred to by J. D. Eisenstein in article "Plague" in The Jewish Encyclopedia, X, 70) by Zedekiah b. Abraham Anaw, who flourished at Rome during the 13th century, corresponds exactly to their fourfold classification by Philo. The author has evidently derived this classification independently from Scriptural verses, though the cultural conditions of the Jews at that time in Rome and their relation to Christian scholars (cf. M. Güdemann, Gesch. des Erziehungswesens und der Cultur der Juden in Italien, p. 191) do not exclude the possibility of his having somehow heard of Philo's classification.

[49] Ibid., I, 31, 174.

something wrought by God, either indirectly or directly, which would not have taken place by the ordinary processes of nature. They are "impossibilities no doubt as judged by what to outward appearance is credible and reasonable but easily accomplished by the dispensations of God's providence." [50] The scope of miracles includes such performances as the transference of the function of one element to another, as, e.g., for air, instead of earth, to bring forth food,[51] or the changing of the property of an element, as, e.g., for fire to move in a direction contrary to its nature,[52] or even the changing of the nature of a composite object, as, e.g., for the serpent to speak with a human voice.[53]

Sometimes indeed he attempts to explain some miracle recorded in Scripture by natural causes. Thus the story of how Moses had made sweet the bitter water of Marah by throwing a tree into the spring [54] may, according to Philo, be explained as an outright miracle, in which case the tree "was created on this occasion for the service which it was destined to perform," or it may be explained by natural causes, in which case the tree "was formed by nature to exercise a virtue which had hitherto remained unknown." [55] So also in the story of how Moses brought water out of the rock by smiting it with his staff,[56] it may be explained as an outright miracle, in which case "then for the first time a body of water was collected in it through hidden channels and was forced out by impact," or it may be explained by natural causes, in which case "the rock contained originally a spring and now had its artery clean severed." [57] But such attempts at a natural explanation of miracles are not meant by Philo to be a denial of the miraculous nature of the occurrence. They are meant only to show that God sometimes employs the powers of nature to perform His miracles. The fact that the hidden sweetening virtue of the tree and the hid-

[50] Vit. Mos. II, 47, 261.

[51] Ibid., I, 36, 202; II, 48, 267. Cf. Ex. 16, 4 ff.

[52] Quaest. in Gen. IV, 51; Harris, Fragments of Philo Judaeus, p. 34. Cf. Gen. 19, 24.

[53] Ibid., I, 32. Cf. Gen. 3, 2.

[54] Ex. 15, 22–26.

[55] Vit. Mos. I, 33, 185.

[56] Ex. 17, 1–7; Num. 20, 1–13; Deut. 8, 15.

[57] Vit. Mos. I, 38, 210–211.

den spring of the rock were discovered by Moses just at the time when they were needed was due to the miraculous intervention of God.[58] Often, indeed, he tries to give allegorical interpretations to Scriptural miracles. But in such cases, again, the attempt at an allegorical interpretation of miracles should

[58] An explanation of this miracle of bringing forth water out of the rock analogous to that given thereof by Philo occurs in the Mishnaic statement that "the mouth of the well," i.e., the miracle here under consideration, is one of the ten things which were created at twilight on the sixth day of creation (M. Abot V, 6, and see Hebrew commentaries ad loc. and Rashi on Pesaḥim 54a). According to the Midrash, furthermore, not only this miracle and the other nine miracles which are mentioned in the Mishnah as having been created at twilight on the sixth day, but also all the other miracles recorded in Scripture, were created during the six days of creation by the decree of God in agreement with every natural object at the time He brought it into existence (Gen. Rabbah V, 5, and see Maimonides on M. Abot V, 6). The motive underlying this rational explanation of miracles in the Midrash was a desire to reconcile the possibility of miracles with God's expressed promise to observe the laws which He has established in the universe (cf. Ex. Rabbah XXI, 6, and cf. above n. 45). Miracles, according to this Midrashic explanation, are thus not altogether contrary to nature, but still the events in question are not thereby deprived completely of their miraculous character. They are still to be considered as acts due to the direct intervention of God, first by His implanting them in nature as exceptions to their established order and then by His making them occur exactly at the time they were needed and by His announcing their occurrence beforehand.

On the basis of this Midrash, Judah ha-Levi offers the following explanation of miracles: "The changes in the ordinary processes of nature were in accordance with nature, for they have been arranged for and determined upon by the eternal will ever since the six days of creation" (Cuzari III, 73 end). This, too, was not meant by ha-Levi to be a denial of the miraculous nature of the events that happened. In Maimonides this Midrashic view is restated as follows: "The rabbis consider these miracles as being to some extent also natural, for they say that when God created the universe and endowed it with these natural properties, He made it part of these properties that they should produce certain miracles at certain times. The sign of a prophet consists accordingly in the fact that God made known to him the time he should announce the event that is to take place and informed him that the event would take place in accordance with what has been implanted in nature from the beginning of its creation" (Moreh Nebukim II, 29; cf. Shemoneh Peraḳim, ch. 8; Commentary on M. Abot V, 6). I do not think therefore that Bréhier (Les idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d'Alexandrie, 2nd ed., p. 182) is quite right in taking Philo's attempts at a rational explanation of some miracles as an indication of his disbelief in miracles.

Examples of miracles rationally explained by Philo are given also in Goodenough (By Light, Light, pp. 187–188), but the author quite properly draws no inference therefrom as to Philo's belief in miracles. Siegfried (Philo von Alexandria, p. 210) sees in these attempts at a rational explanation of miracles evidence of the existence of some lingering doubt in the mind of Philo as to the logical reconcilability of miracles with his conception of God — which, as we have seen, is exactly the motive underlying the Midrashic attempt at a rational explanation of miracles.

not be taken as a denial of their historicity as actual facts. Thus in the story of how Moses smote the rock and brought forth water, besides explaining it as an outright miracle or as a miracle by natural causes, he also explains it allegorically, taking the 'rock' and the 'water' as referring to the immutable God from whom showers forth the birth of all that exists.[59] This allegorical interpretation certainly does not mean a denial of the historicity of the event, the veracity of which, as we have seen, is accepted by him elsewhere; it only means that the event, true historically though it is, has also an allegorical meaning and that it points to a moral in addition to its recording a fact. Only in the story of creation, with reference to which his allegorical interpretation may be taken to be a denial of the literalness of the narrative, does he declare such a miracle as the creation of Eve out of one of the ribs of Adam [60] as being of the nature of a myth.[61] The story of creation is treated as in a class by itself throughout the history of the philosophic interpretation of Scripture and many a theologian, whether Jewish or Christian, about whose belief in the possibility of miracles and in the historicity of the miracles recorded in Scripture there can be no doubt, allowed himself to interpret the story of creation as purely allegorical.[62] But even in connection with the story of creation, this particular story of the creation of Eve is elsewhere taken by Philo as a historical event.[63]

[59] Somn. II, 32, 221–222; Leg. All. II, 21, 84.

[60] Gen. 2, 21. "Sides" instead of "ribs" in the Septuagint and Philo.

[61] Leg. All. II, 7, 19.

[62] As, e.g., Origen, who believed in the historicity of the miraculous events recorded in Scripture (cf. Cont. Cels. II, 48–53) and yet takes the stories of creation in a purely allegorical sense (Princ. IV, 1, 16), explicitly mentioning the story of the creation of Eve as being a mere allegory (Cont. Cels. IV, 38). Similarly Maimonides affirms his belief in the historicity of Scriptural narratives, including those of the miracles (Moreh Nebukim III, 50), and yet he declares that "the account given in the Pentateuch of creation is not, as generally believed by the common people, to be taken in its literal sense in all its parts" (ibid., II, 29). Here again Bréhier (op. cit., p. 184) takes Philo's statement with regard to the story of the creation of Eve as an indication of his rejection of the historicity of all the miraculous stories recorded in Scripture.

[63] According to Bréhier (loc. cit.), all of Philo's declarations as to his belief in the historicity of the Scriptural miracles which are to be found in his De Vita Mosis and the Quaestiones should be taken allegorically, whereas his allegorical interpretations of Scriptural miracles which are to be found in his Legum Allegoria should be taken literally.

The allegorical explanation of miracles by Philo is thus no denial of their historicity as events which actually took place, just as his occasional attempt at a rational explanation of them is no denial of the miraculous nature of those events. It is therefore quite literally and without any equivocation of language that he could proclaim that "if anyone disbelieves these things, he neither knows God nor has ever sought to know Him; for if he did he would at once have perceived — aye, perceived with a firm apprehension — that these extraordinary and seemingly incredible events are but child's-play to God." [64] If one should doubt the power of God to work miracles, he throws out the challenge, let him look at the world which was created and ordered by God. In comparison with the wonders of the universe, all of which are the work of God, all these recorded "extraordinary and seemingly incredible events are but child's-play to God." [65] The act of creation itself is to him one of the greatest of miracles and, if God could do that, nothing is impossible for Him, for "as God called up His most perfect work, the world, out of not being into being, so He called up plenty in the desert, changing round the elements to meet the pressing need of the occasion." [66] The act of creation as an argument for the possibility of miracles comes up again and again in later religious philosophy.[67]

His conception of miracles as a certain element of freedom reserved by God for Himself even after He has implanted the laws of nature in the world is clearly expressed by him in his statement that while God has implanted certain unalterable laws in the universe by bestowing upon it "powers (*δυνάμεις*)," He did not bestow upon it "independent powers (*αὐτοκρατεῖς*)," so that, "like a charioteer grasping the reins or a pilot the tiller, He guides all things in what direction He pleases as law (*νόμον*)

[64] Vit. Mos. I, 38, 212.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Ibid., II, 48, 262.

[67] So Tertullian uses the act of creation as an argument for the possibility of the miracle of resurrection (cf. De resur. carn. c. XI). St. Augustine uses it as an argument for resurrection as well as for miracles in general (De civ. Dei XXI, 7). Similarly Maimonides uses creation as an argument for the possibility of miracles in general (Moreh Nebukim II, 25) and for the possibility of resurrection in particular (Ma'amar Teḥiyyat ha-Metim, c. 42, p. 30, ed. Joshua Finkel; Ḳobeẓ, II, p. 10vb).

and right (δίκην) demand, standing in need of no one besides: for all things are possible to God." [68] The "law and right" in this passage refer to God's own law and right and not to the order of nature which He has established; the implication is that God does in the world and with the order which He has established in it whatever to His inscrutable wisdom is just and right in a given particular instance, even when by doing so He has to upset the laws of nature which He has established for the general good of the world as a whole which He has created. A similar type of reasoning appears later in mediaeval philosophy in connection with the problem of miracles. There arises the question that the assumption that God does occasionally change the order of nature must inevitably mean also the assumption that God acts unjustly, inasmuch as the order of nature is the same as the order of justice. St. Thomas' answer to this is that for God to do something against the order of nature or justice as established by Him in the world does not mean that He does something against the order of His own nature and His own justice.[69] The world is thus conceived by Philo as a world which is run according to a certain pre-established law on a scheduled timetable, and man can make his plans in the world with a reasonable expectancy that that which has been is that which shall be and that the order of nature will remain constant. But still he is to know that God can change this order and this schedule without previous notice, though not without some good reason known only to Himself.

Thus Philo has modified, or perhaps he thought that he only interpreted, Plato's conception of the unalterability of the laws of nature in accordance with his belief in the miraculous intervention of God in the established order of the universe. While agreeing with Plato that God has implanted universal laws in nature and that these laws can be relied upon, for all practical purposes, to operate with uniformity and with a certain scheduled regularity, still God can upset these laws of nature, and in fact He did upset them on many occasions in the past as an act of goodness to men in time of their need. God to Philo is thus not altogether indifferent to the vicissitudes of

[68] Op. Mundi 15, 46.

[69] Sum. Theol. I, 105, 6.

human beings, or at least to those of such human beings as are especially favored by Him, in their unequal struggle against the inexorable forces of nature, and He does on certain occasions interfere on their behalf and help them to come victorious out of that struggle. Similarly also, as a modification of Plato, or, perhaps, in his opinion, as an interpretation of him, he considered God as being not altogether indifferent to the struggle in man of mind against the forces of the body. God, according to Philo, would not let man be a passive object in the struggle of mind and body. He would not allow that the struggle between mind and body should be determined, as the struggle between two bodies, by the ordinary laws of nature. Mind was therefore endowed by God with part of that power, which He himself possesses, of upsetting the laws of nature. As a divine grace man was given that freedom of action by which God himself in a miraculous way comes to the help of His chosen ones in their struggle against the odds of nature. The determination of the mind to do or not to do is thus not the result of natural causes which are "of God" or "according to God" and by which the unalterable laws of nature established by God in the world are operated. Such a determination by the mind is a break in the nexus of these natural laws and in the established laws of the universe even as miracles are. This power with which the human mind was endowed to choose or not to choose refers not only to the choice of good, but also to the choice of evil, even though the mind is by its very nature rational, for, as says Philo, there are in our mind "voluntary inclinations (ἑκουσίους τροπάς) to what is wrong." [70] The essential rationality of the mind does not preclude the possibility of its acting, by the mere power of its free will, against the dictates of reason.

The difference between Plato and Philo on the question of human freedom is clearly brought out in their respective treatments of the question of human responsibility and of the justifiability of punishment meted out to wrong-doers by both God and the state.

Plato does not raise this question directly, but from the answers which he provides against such a question we may

[70] Quod det. pot. ins. 32, 122.

judge that he was conscious of it. The question as it must have appeared to him was of a double nature. In the first place, he wanted to justify the punishment which according to his eschatology is meted out to the souls of those who live in unrighteousness by their being reincarnated successively in the bodies of various creatures until they turn from the evil of their ways.[71] In the second place, he wanted to justify the penalty meted out by the state to wrong-doers for various offences.[72]

In answer to the first question, he simply states that divine justice is vindicated by the fact that at the very beginning, when the individual souls were about to be put for the first time in human bodies, they were all given an equal start and were all equally warned of the consequences of their future behavior, for, as they were distributed among the stars prior to their being put in human bodies, "He shewed to them the nature of the universe and declared unto them the laws of destiny, — namely, how that the first incarnation should be ordained to be the same for all, in order that none might suffer disadvantage at His hands; and how it was needful that they, when sown each into his own proper organ of time (i.e., star), should be born as the most God-fearing of living creatures (i.e., mankind)." [73] This equality of start and this equality of warning, according to Plato, was given by God to men "to the end that He might be blameless of the future wickedness of any one of them." [74] By this Plato exculpates God from any moral responsibility for the evil of human conduct. "The blame is his who chooses: God is blameless." [75] Ontologically, too, God to him is not the cause of evil,[76] nor is the soul as such the cause thereof. Evil arises out of the fact that the soul placed in the body happens to be overridden by the body, when man by his irrational desires allows it to become thus overridden.[77] It is our duty, therefore, says Plato, "to try to escape from earth to the dwelling place of the Gods as quickly as we can; and to escape is to become like God, so far as this is possible; and to

[71] Tim. 42 B–D.
[72] Legg. IX, 860 B; cf. IV, 718 B.
[73] Tim. 41 E.
[74] Ibid., 42 D.
[75] Rep. X, 617 E.
[76] Ibid., II, 379 C.
[77] Tim. 42 E; cf. Legg. X, 900 E, 904 A.

become like God is to become righteous and holy and wise." [78] This is as far as Plato goes in exculpating God of the evil man does. But the fundamental question whether man's own irrational desires by which his rational soul is overridden are themselves pre-determined by causes outside of man's will, and whether also man by a will absolutely free and undetermined could at any moment arbitrarily change the course of his action — that is not dealt with by Plato. God's responsibility, according to him, ends with the creation of the world, which was the best possible world which could be created and within which the souls of all men had an equal start. Once the world was created and the souls for all future men planted in it, God retired, as it were, from the world, letting it run according to the laws which He had established in it. There is no individual providence in the philosophy of Plato.

In answer to the second question, Plato seems to admit that inasmuch as man's actions are to a large extent pre-determined and are not entirely his free choice, the only justification for the punishment of criminals by the state is that such punishments are either curative or deterrent, for the wrong-doer is to pay the penalty for his misdeed, says Plato, only "in order that for the future both he himself and those who behold his punishment may either utterly loathe his sin or at least renounce to a great extent such lamentable conduct." [79] Even the punishment of death inflicted upon incurable criminals is justified by him on the ground that "not only is it better for the sinners themselves to live no longer, but also they will prove of a double benefit to others by quitting life — since they will both serve as a warning to the rest not to act unjustly, and also rid the state of wicked men." [80] Indeed Plato speaks of a distinction between voluntary wrong-doings and involuntary wrong-doings [81] as well as of a distinction between a voluntary lie and an involuntary lie,[82] but, as we have seen, the term 'voluntary'

[78] Theat. 176 A.

[79] Legg. XI, 934 A.

[80] Ibid., IX, 862 E; cf. XII, 958 A. Cf. R. D. Archer-Hind, the Timaeus of Plato, p. 325, ad 86 E.

[81] Ibid., IX, 861 B.

[82] Rep. VII, 535 E; Legg. V, 730 C.

here is used by him in the sense of (1) not being compelled by some external force and in the sense of (2) not being ignorant of what one does.[83]

In Philo this question of human responsibility and of the justification of punishment is touched upon in many places, though it is never treated in a complete and systematic manner. But in all the passages wherein the problem is treated, though at first sight the sentiments expressed in them seem to be so much like those of Plato, we discern certain expressions which, taken in connection with his views we have found elsewhere, seem to emphasize his belief in the absolute freedom of the human mind. Thus in one passage wherein he discusses the superiority of man to brute animals he says that man is "blamed for what he does wrong with intent and praised when he acts rightly of his own will" on account of his possession of "a volitional and self-determining mind, whose activities for the most part rest on deliberate choice (προαιρετικαῖς)." [84] This by itself may perhaps not mean more than Aristotle's statement that men are praised or blamed only for voluntary actions [85] and that they are praised or blamed for virtues or vices [86] because virtues and vices are actions which involve deliberate choice (προαιρετική).[87] By itself, then, Philo's statement may perhaps mean only, as does Aristotle's statement, that a voluntary action is an action without external compulsion and without ignorance.[88] But when Philo says that God gave to the human mind a portion "of that free-will which is His most peculiar possession and most worthy of His majesty" [89] and that by this gift of free-will the human mind "in this respect has been made to resemble Him," [90] it is quite evident that by man's free will Philo means an absolutely undetermined freedom like that enjoyed by God, who by his power to work

[83] Cf. above, nn. 30–31.
[84] Quod Deus immut. 10, 47.
[85] Eth. Nic. III, 1, 1109b, 31.
[86] Ibid., II, 5, 1105b, 31–1106a, 2.
[87] Ibid, II, 6, 1106b, 36; cf. II, 5, 1106a, 3–4.
[88] Ibid., III, 1, 1109b, 35 ff.
[89] Quod Deus immut. 10, 47.
[90] Ibid., 48.

miracles can upset the laws of nature and the laws of causality which He himself has established. It is because of this undetermined freedom possessed by man that Philo frees God of blame for the sins committed by man and justifies the punishment meted out to man for his sin, for the human soul thus "being liberated, as far as might be, from the hard and ruthless mistress, necessity, may justly be charged with guilt, in that it does not honor its Liberator and therefore it will rightly pay the inexorable penalty which is meted to ungrateful freedmen." [91]

That a voluntary act to Philo does not mean, as it does to Plato and Aristotle, an action done with knowledge is made clear by him in his homily on the Scriptural verses: "Behold I have set before thy face life and death, good and evil; choose life," [92] which is the standard verse upon which both the rabbis and the Church Fathers draw for proof of their view as to the freedom of the will. "By this," he says, "He puts before us both doctrines: first, that men have been made with a knowledge of good and of its opposite, evil; second, that it is their duty to choose the better rather than the worse, because they have, as it were, within them an incorruptible judge in the reasoning faculty, which will accept all that right reason suggests and reject the promptings of its opposite." [93] It will be noticed that the knowledge of good and evil does not in itself constitute a voluntary act; knowledge is merely a condition under which one exercises the power of the freedom of choice. "He had made him free and unfettered, to employ his powers of action with voluntary and deliberate choice for this purpose, that, knowing good and ill . . . , he might practice to choose the better and avoid the opposite." [94] In fact, according to Philo, all men have a knowledge of the good, but some, notwithstanding that knowledge, choose by their own free will to follow the base, and it is because they had that knowledge of the good that they are convicted for the choice they have made. "Who indeed is so lacking in reason or soul that he never either with or without his will receives a conception of the best? Nay, even over the reprobate hovers often of a sudden the vision of

[91] Quod Deus immut. 48.
[92] Deut. 30, 15 and 19.
[93] Quod Deus immut. 10, 50.
[94] Ibid., 49.

the excellent, but to grasp it and to keep it among them they are unable. . . . Nay, never would it have come to them save to convict those who choose the base instead of the noble." [95] This statement, too, on the face of it, may be merely a reflection of Plato's view that all men by their very nature have the capacity to regain the vision of the ideas for fleeting moments during their lifetime, though it is only philosophers who by their special training and preparation can be in continuous communication with them.[96] But Philo, as will have been noticed, in restating this view, says that those reprobates, who have a sudden vision of the excellent and get some knowledge of it, out of their own free will choose the base instead of the noble and that it is for this reason that they are held responsible for their deeds and are convicted.

Yet, as we have seen above, in his statement about the choice of good Philo is not so explicit as in his statement about the choice of evil. He does not definitely say, as he does in the case of evil in general, that it is not directly caused by God, nor does he say, as he does in the case of involuntary sin, that it is not "of God" in the sense that it is not caused by God for the direct purpose of causing man to sin. All he says about it is that it is performed "by our voluntary choice." The question may therefore be raised whether in this voluntary choice of good God has a part, and, if so, what that part is.

An answer to this question is to be found in a fragment from the lost fourth book of his Legum Allegoria, which contains another homily on the verses: "Behold I have set before thy face life and death, good and evil; choose life, that thou mayest live." [97] The homily reads as follows:

> It is a happy thing for the soul to be able to choose the better of the two choices put forward by the Creator, but it is happier for it not to choose, but for the Creator to bring it over to himself and improve it. For, strictly speaking, the human mind does not choose the good through itself, but in accordance with the thoughtfulness of God, since He bestows the fairest things upon the worthy. For two main principles are with the Lawgiver, namely, that on the one hand God does not govern all things as a man and that on the other hand He trains and educates

[95] Gigant. 5, 20–21.

[96] Phaedr. 249 B–D; cf. Grote, Plato II, 219.

[97] Deut. 30, 15 and 19.

> us as a man.[98] Accordingly, whenever he sets up the second principle, God is a man, and he represents our mind as capable of knowing anything, and willing, and choosing, and avoiding. But when he sets up the first and better principle, God is not as man and the powers and principles of all things are attached to God, leaving no work to a created being, since he has represented him as inactive and passive. He shows this when he says in other words that "God has known those who are His and those who are (His) holy [and] He has brought [them] near [to himself]." (Num. 16, 5.) But if selections and rejections are in strictness made by the one cause, why do you advise me, legislator, to choose, as though we were autocrats of our choice? But he would answer: Hear something more elementary than such as the foregoing, for these things are said to those who have not yet been initiated in the great mysteries about the sovereignty and authority of the Uncreated and the exceeding nothingness of the created.[99]

The view expressed in this fragment has been characterized by Drummond as one which "in effect reduces the belief in free-will to a useful delusion of the less educated," [100] and it would seem to be contradictory to Philo's statements elsewhere as to the existence of free will in man. We shall attempt, however, to show that this fragment does not teach a denial of free will, but rather that it stresses a certain fundamental detail supplementary to Philo's conception of freedom.

If we examine the fragment carefully we shall note in it two curious facts.

In the first place, the fragment deals only with man's choice of the good but makes no mention at all of man's choice of evil. It only says that "the human mind does not choose the good through itself"; it does not say that it does not choose the evil through itself. Indeed it speaks of the mind as being unable through itself to avoid as well as to choose, to reject as well as to select, but the terms 'avoid (*φυγεῖν*)' and 'reject (*ἀπεκλογαί*),' judging from his use elsewhere of the expression "he might practice to choose the better and avoid (*φυγῇ*) the opposite," [101] mean here to avoid and reject evil, which is a form

[98] The reference here is to the Scriptural statements "God is not as a man" (Num. 23, 19) and "as a man would chasten his son, so the Lord thy God will chasten thee" (Deut. 8, 5) discussed by Philo in Quod Deus immut. 11, 53 ff. and elsewhere.

[99] Harris, Fragments of Philo Judaeus, p. 8. Parts of the translation of this fragment are from Drummond's Philo Judaeus, I, 347, n.

[100] Drummond, loc. cit.

[101] Quod Deus immut. 10, 49.

of choosing good. Now this omission of any reference to the cause of the choice of evil cannot be accidental and merely due to the fact that in the verse quoted (Deut. 30, 19) there is only the statement "choose life," for previous to that verse there is also mention of the possibility of the choice of evil and death (Deut. 30, 17–18). The omission of any reference to the choice of evil in this fragment can be accounted for only by the fact that the point which Philo was going to make in this homily was that only the choice of good was caused by God, but not choice of evil. No evil, as he repeats in a variety of ways, can come directly from God, and this includes the evil-doing of man as well as evil done to man.[102]

In the second place, with regard to the choice of good, we may say at the very outset that such sweeping statements in this passage about the "exceeding nothingness of the created" and the "sovereignty and authority of the uncreated" and about the fact that "the powers and causes of all things are attached to God" and about the unreality of the presentation of the human mind as being "capable of knowing anything, and willing, and choosing, and avoiding" do not in themselves indicate that Philo denied of man the freedom to choose good. Even with his belief in absolute human freedom he could make these statements, in view of the fact that that freedom, as he has said in his extant works, is a gift bestowed upon man by God, a portion of his own power of freedom, whereby he is made to resemble God.[103] These general statements by themselves do not therefore conclusively prove anything with regard to the exact belief of Philo as to the question of man's power to choose good. What he exactly meant to say on this question in this fragment of his lost work must be determined by a careful examination of some of the other statements contained in this fragment as well as of some of the implications of what he leaves unsaid in it.

Now it will have been noticed that in contradistinction to his statement in his extant works with regard to the choice of evil, that it is of our own will,[104] he says here about the choice of

[102] Cf. above, n. 40.

[103] Cf. above, nn. 89, 90.

[104] Cf. above, n. 35.

good that "selections and rejections are in strictness made by the one Cause," that is to say, directly by God. Furthermore, God's direct causation of man's choice of good, it will also be noticed, is described as "the thoughtfulness of God, while He bestows the fairest things upon the *worthy*." This quite obviously implies that man must first do something to render himself worthy of the bestowal upon him by God of the power to choose good. Now that doing of something by which man renders himself worthy in the eyes of God to receive the still greater power of choosing good must inevitably refer to some act of free will. This, however, could certainly not refer to some act of free will exercised in the choice of evil, as that would hardly render man worthy of the gracious gift of the choice of good. It must therefore inevitably refer to some act of free will in the avoidance of evil or in the choice of good. Thus this fragment, in trying to attribute man's choice of good to God, assumes that man himself already possesses some part of freedom to make such a choice. Furthermore, in the very opening statement of this fragment Philo says that "it is a happy thing for the soul to be able to choose (*ἰσχύειν λαβεῖν*), but it is happier for it not to choose (*μὴ αὐτὴν ἑλέσθαι*), but for the Creator to bring it over to himself and improve it." Note the difference in wording between "to be able to choose" and "not to choose." If the wording of these two statements was chosen with care, and we have no reason to doubt that it was so chosen, then the evident meaning of this statement is not to deny the soul's ability to choose the better but rather to assert that, while the soul is able of itself to choose the better, it actually does not make that choice by itself but God brings it to himself and improves it.

The cumulative impression of all these statements then is that, while a man is able to choose the better, he will not have to rely upon his own power, that is to say, that power of free will with which God has endowed all men, for, if he proves himself worthy, God, through His thoughtfulness, will aid him in making that choice by bringing him to himself. The direct intervention of God in man's choice of good dealt with in this fragment must therefore be assumed to refer only to some help

lent by God to man in the choice of good, when man proves himself worthy of such a help by trying by his own power of free will with which God has endowed all men to avoid evil and to choose good. When therefore in this fragment God is spoken of as the cause of man's choice of the good, this statement is to be understood in two senses: (1) as the ultimate cause of the free will with which all men are endowed and (2) as the auxiliary cause of certain particular acts of the choice of good where man has proved himself worthy by exercising his free will in the avoidance of evil and in the pursuit of good.

This conception of divine aid or grace in the choice of good to those who have already by their general power of free will taken the initial steps towards the attainment of the good is expressed by Philo in several passages in his extant writings. In one of these passages, comparing the righteous mind in the soul of the individual to the righteous man in the race, he declares that, when a man has not completely succumbed to temptation and his rational soul or mind has not been completely effaced by sin and wickedness induced by the passions of his irrational soul, he will be helped by God to save himself by the choice of good. "Let us pray then," he says, "that, like a central pillar in a house, there may constantly remain for the healing of our maladies the righteous mind in the soul and in the human race the righteous man; for while he is sound and well, there is no cause to despair of the prospect of complete salvation, for our Saviour God holds out, we may be sure, the most all-healing remedy, His gracious power, and commits it to His suppliant and worshipper to use for the deliverance of those who are sickly, that He may apply it as an embrocation to those soul-wounds which were left gaping by the sword-edge of follies and injustices and all the rest of the horde of vices." [105] The implication of this passage is quite clear: if man by his own free choice has kept himself from being completely sunk in evil and sin, even though he has not been able to resist temptation altogether, God by His power of graciousness will come to his assistance and will help him to choose the way to salvation.

The same view is also implied in another passage.[106] In that

[105] Migr. Abr. 22, 124. [106] Leg. All. III, 46, 133–137.

passage Philo speaks of the ordinary run of men who are constantly tossed about between reason and passion. He describes them as those who "set out to wage war on the passions on an insignificant, not on a grand, scale, but seek to come to terms and arrange a truce with them, putting forward the word of pacification." [107] Such men, he says, can acquire virtue only by toil (πόνῳ).[108] But, he adds, toil itself cannot achieve virtue without the help of God and consequently "it is necessary that the soul should not ascribe to itself its toil for virtue, but that it should take it away from itself and refer it to God, confessing that not its own strength or power acquired nobility, but He who freely bestowed also the love of it," [109] for, he concludes, "only then does the soul begin to be saved, when the seat of anger has received reason as its charioteer, and toil has come to create in it, not self-satisfaction, but a readiness to yield the honor to God, the Bestower of the boon." [110] From the entire context of the passage it is clear that what Philo means to say is that man by his mind, which is endowed with freedom implanted in it by God, can of himself through toil take the initial steps in the attainment of virtue. He cannot, however, through himself and by his own toil achieve virtue. Mere toil will not lead him to the desired end, if not accompanied by a realization that his ability to take the initial steps in the attainment of virtue and to toil for it is in itself a gift of God. Once he realizes that, God will help him to attain virtue.

In still another passage, speaking of the two natures in man, the irrational and the rational, he says, "Let us offer a noble and suitable prayer, which Moses offered before us, that 'God may open to us His own treasury' (Deut. 28, 12) and that sublime reason pregnant with divine illumination to which He has given the title of 'heaven'; and that He may close up the treasuries of evil things," [111] concluding that God indeed "opens the treasury of good things but closes the treasuries of evil things." [112] Here, again, the implication is that sin is closed up

[107] Leg. All. III, 46, 134.

[108] Ibid., 135.

[109] Ibid., 136.

[110] Ibid., 137.

[111] Ibid., III, 34, 104.

[112] Ibid., 105. In § 104 Philo uses definitely good in the sense of virtue and evil in the sense of sin, whereas in § 105 good and evil are used by him respectively in the sense

by God and man chooses it entirely by his own free will, whereas virtue is left open by God so that if man makes an effort by his own free will to reach it, he can easily find it with the help of God.

This conception of a divine grace or help in the attainment of virtue to those who of themselves with the power given to them by God make an effort to attain it was evidently common among the Jews, both Hellenistic and Palestinian, at the time of Philo. In the Wisdom of Solomon man is represented as having the power to love righteousness and the Lord and Wisdom and to be able to seek them [113] and also as being able by his own power to keep the Law which constitutes the love of Wisdom.[114] But still man is said not to be able to obtain Wisdom without the help of God and one of the conditions of obtaining the help of God, it is further said, is to know that Wisdom is a gift of God for which one has to pray [115] and, if one prays for it, it will be given to him.[116] A suggestion of this view of divine grace as supplementary to free will may perhaps be also discerned in one of the descriptions of the Pharisaic doctrine given by Josephus.[117] More definitely is this combination of the element of divine grace with absolute free will expressed by the rabbis in many statements, of which the following ones are characteristic. Commenting on the verse, "Surely he scorneth the scorners, but he giveth grace unto the lowly," [118] they say: "To him who desires to contaminate himself doors are open (to go out and act according to his free choice); to one who desires to purify himself assistance will be given (from heaven)," [119] for as they say elsewhere: "The evil impulse of man gains strength against him every day . . . and were it not for the help of the Holy One he could not prevail against it." [120]

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of reward and punishment. Here as elsewhere the two meanings of good and evil are used by Philo indiscriminately. Cf. above, n. 40.

[113] Wisdom I, 1; 6, 12.

[114] Ibid., 6, 18.

[115] Ibid., 8, 21.

[116] Ibid., 7, 7. On the doctrine of grace in Hellenistic Judaism see also A. D. Nock, St. Paul, p. 75.

[117] Cf. below, n. 146.

[118] Prov. 3, 34.

[119] Shabbat 104a and parallels.

[120] Sukkah 52b; Kiddushin 20b.

While the ordinary run of men, according to Philo, could acquire virtue only by toil with the assistance of divine grace, there were certain persons, he maintains, to whom virtue was natural and they needed not to toil in order to attain it. Of such a nature, according to him, was Moses, "because he, being perfect, has no small or petty aims, nor any desire to moderate his passions, but goes so far as to cut off all passions everywhere," [121] and consequently he "received virtue easily and without toil from the hands of God." [122] Of such a nature was also Noah. "For should anyone ask why the prophet says that Noah found grace in the sight of the Lord God [123] when as yet he had, so far as our knowledge goes, done no fair deed, we shall give a suitable answer to the effect that he is shown to be of an excellent nature from his birth." [124] So also were Melchizedek,[125] Abraham,[126] Isaac [127] and Jacob.[128] But this perfect nature with which all these perfect persons were endowed from their birth was itself a gift by divine grace, for, as he says in his discussion of Isaac: "Some even before their birth God endows with a goodly form and equipment, and has determined that they shall have a most excellent portion." [129] Whether this view that certain Scriptural personages were endowed from birth with a disposition to virtue meant also that the personages so endowed were absolutely sinless during their lifetime is not stated by Philo. All he says about them, as will have been noticed, is that by a certain natural endowment they could receive virtue easily and without toil. Elsewhere he makes the general statement that "sin is congenital to every created being, even the best, just because it is created." [130] Whether this statement includes also those whom he describes as having been favored by God with a most excellent portion is not clear. In rabbinic literature, conflicting opinions are expressed as to the sinlessness of the Patriarchs.[131] Similarly with

[121] Leg. All. III, 46, 134.
[122] Ibid., 135.
[123] Gen. 6, 8.
[124] Leg. All. III, 24, 77.
[125] Ibid., 25, 79–81.
[126] Ibid., 27, 83–84.
[127] Ibid., 28, 85–87.
[128] Ibid., 29, 88–89.
[129] Ibid., 28, 85.
[130] Vit. Mos. II, 29, 147.
[131] (1) That they did sin: 'Arakin 17a; Midrash Tehillim on Ps. 16, 2; Eccles. Rabbah on Eccles. 4, 3; Nedarim 32a and parallels. (2) That they did not sin: Mekilta

regard to Moses, sometimes he is spoken of as having committed certain sins,[132] whereas sometimes he is spoken of as if he were sinless.[133] Noah is represented as having sinned immediately after he had found grace in the sight of the Lord God.[134] Whether those Scriptural personages, such as the Patriarchs and Moses, who in rabbinic literature are represented either as being predominantly virtuous or as being absolutely free of sin, were also considered by the rabbis, as they were by Philo, as being endowed by God from birth with an excellent nature which made it easy for them to acquire virtue is not clear. Such a rabbinic statement as that the Patriarchs were three exceptional men "over whom the Evil Impulse had no power" [135] may perhaps mean, as is the opinion of Philo, that they were endowed from birth with a special gift to resist evil; but it may also be only a description of the fact that by their own free will and toil they subdued the Evil Impulse.

It is in the light of this analysis of his conception of free will that a great many of the vague statements in which the homilies of Philo abound are to be understood. As an example I shall take his homily on the verse: "God cast a trance upon Adam and he went to sleep." [136] He takes this verse allegorically as referring to "mind" which "falls into a trance when it ceases to be engaged with objects appropriate to it," and from the words "God cast a trance" he infers that "this change and turning which he undergoes is not by himself but by God who 'casts it on him,' that is, brings and sends it on him." He then tries to prove this empirically. "For if the change were in our hands I should have recourse to it, when I wished, and when it was not my deliberate choice I should then continue unturned. But as it is, the change is actually repugnant to me, and many

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on Ex. 16, 10 (ed. Weiss, p. 57b; ed. Friedmann, p. 48a; ed. Lauterbach, II, 106). Cf. S. Schechter, Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology, 173; G. F. Moore, Judaism, I, 468; L. Ginzberg, The Legends of the Jews, V, 220, n. 66; 228, n. 110.

[132] Yoma 86b and parallels. Cf. Ginzberg, op. cit., VI, 109, n. 616; 148, n. 889.

[133] Shabbat 55b; Sifre on Deut. 32, 50 (ed. Friedmann, § 339).

[134] Peṭirat Mosheh in Jellinek, Bet ha-Midrash, I, 118. Cf. Ginzberg, op. cit., III, 427; V, 186, n. 49.

[135] Baba Batra 17a.

[136] Gen. 2, 21.

a time when wishing to entertain some fitting thought, I am drenched by a flood of unfitting matters pouring over me; and conversely when on the point of admitting a conception of something vile, I have washed the vile thing away with wholesome thoughts, God having by His grace poured upon my soul a sweet draught in place of the bitter one." [137] At first sight it would seem that, contrary to what we have shown from Philo's other statements, that according to him evil is never caused directly by God and that in the choice of good God is only an auxiliary cause, he says here that the choice of evil is not of our own free will but is caused by God and that similarly God forces upon us the good contrary to our free choice. But upon a closer examination of this passage we shall find that it falls in with Philo's views as we have found them elsewhere.

To begin with, the statement here that unfitting matters pour over man even when he wishes to entertain some fitting thought is to be taken to refer to involuntary sins, which, according to Philo, as we have seen,[138] are committed by man as a result of the fact that owing to his past record he has been chosen by God's will as an instrument of His judgment. Accordingly the other statement here that "this change and turning which he undergoes is not by himself but by God" is to be understood as referring not to sins directly caused by God but rather to those brought about incidentally as a result of his having been chosen by God as the instrument of His judgment. Then the statement here about wholesome thoughts with which God in His grace washes away the conception of something vile which man is on the point of admitting is to be taken to refer to a case where the man in question has merited in the eyes of God that special assistance in the attainment of good which, according to the other passages we have discussed, God extends to those who are worthy of it.

That this is the meaning of the passage is shown in the sequel. "Now every created thing must necessarily undergo change, for this is its property, even as unchangeableness is the property of God. But, while some, after being changed, remain so until they are entirely destroyed, others continue so only so

[137] Leg. All. II, 9, 31–32.

[138] Cf. above, n. 40.

far as to experience that to which all flesh is liable, and these forthwith. This is why Moses says, 'He will not permit the destroyer to come into your houses to smite you' (Ex. 12, 23): for He does indeed permit the destroyer — ('destruction' being the change or turning of the soul) — to enter into the soul, that He may make it evident that what is peculiar to created things is there; but God will not let the offspring of the 'seeing' Israel be in such wise changed as to receive his death-blow by the change, but will force him to rise and emerge as though from deep water and recover." [139] The meaning of this passage is quite clear. That man should change from fitting thoughts to unfitting is necessary by the general scheme of God which made man's soul consist of a rational and an irrational part. That some men should remain in their changed condition and lead a life of wickedness until they are destroyed is also in accordance with the divine scheme which endowed man with freedom of choice. That God should not allow the Israelites to go to utter destruction by their wrong-doing is also in accordance with his view that God extends His grace and help to those who are worthy of salvation and that to Him the Israelites are worthy of such salvation, if not by their merit, then by the merit of their ancestors, who were especially elected by God, and whose merit is inherited by their offspring. This last view refers to the principle of the "merit of the Fathers" which is dwelt so much upon in rabbinic theology,[140] and which goes back to the Scriptural verse: "Only the Lord had a delight in thy Fathers to love them, and He chose their seed after them." [141]

His view that God has reserved for himself the power to upset the laws of nature by working miracles has provided Philo, as we have seen, with a logical explanation for human freedom. Free will in man is nothing but a part of God's own freedom, with which man is endowed by God. But the question inevitably arises how such freedom can be reconciled with the knowledge which God is said to possess of all things even before they happen. Philo does not raise this question directly, nor does

[139] Leg. All. II, 9, 33–34.

[140] Cf. Schector, op. cit., 170–198; Moore, op. cit., I, 536–545.

[141] Deut. 10, 15; cf. 4, 37; 7, 6–8.

he discuss it, but without much ado he asserts his belief both in the foreknowledge of God and in the free will of man, "for," he says, "God the maker of living beings knoweth well the different pieces of His own handiwork, even before He has thoroughly chiselled and consummated them, and the faculties which they are to display in a later time, in a word their deeds and experiences." [142] Again: "So Moses says that God brought all the animals to Adam, wishing to see what appellations he would assign to them severally. Not that He was in any doubt — for to God nothing is unknown — but because He knew that He had formed in mortal man the natural ability to reason of his own motion, that so He himself might have no share in faulty action." [143] The same combination of divine foreknowledge and human free will is also to be found in one of the descriptions of the Pharisaic doctrine given by Josephus, in which he says: "They hold that to act rightly or otherwise rests, indeed, for the most part with man, but that in each action Fate (εἱμαρμένη) assists." [144] The term Fate, it has been shown, is used here by Josephus in the sense of Providence [145] and consequently the statement here means that despite man's free will God has a knowledge as well as a foreknowledge of his actions.[146] The

[142] Leg. All. III, 29, 88; cf. Op. Mundi 52, 149. [143] Op. Mundi 52, 149.

[144] Bell. Jud. II, 14, 163. In Ant. XIII, 9, 172, the wording of the statement is different.

[145] Cf. note in Thackeray's translation ad loc., referring to Reinach; G. F. Moore, Fate and Free Will in Jewish Philosophies according to Josephus, Harvard Theological Review, 22 (1929), 379 ff.; I. N. Simḥoni, notes to his Hebrew translation of Bell. Jud., ad loc.; J. Klausner, Historiyyah Yisre'elit, II, 102.

Goodenough, in his By Light, Light, p. 79, takes 'Fate' in this passage of Josephus in its literal sense and makes Josephus attribute to the Pharisees the "doctrine of predestination," concluding: "It is . . . in harmony with the Sadducees that Philo consistently, in its Stoic form, repudiates determinism, to make man a free moral agent." This is not a happy presentation of the case. The point at issue between the Pharisees and the Sadducees, even on the basis of the statements by Josephus, was not on the question of free will; the point at issue between them was on the question of divine providence.

[146] It is not impossible that in his use of the term 'assists (βοηθεῖν)' there is a suggestion of the doctrine of divine grace as supplementary to free will, which we have discussed above n. 117. Moore (op. cit., p. 384) hesitatingly suggests a possible origin of this term in the distinction found in Chrysippus between principal and adjuvant causes. The term *gratia adjuvans* occurs later in Christian theology (see Loofs, Leitfaden zum Studium der Dogmengeschichte, Register, s. v., and cf. below nn. 157–161).

Pharisees, or rather the rabbis, speaking for themselves, say similarly that "everything is in the power of God except the fear of God" [147] and that "everything is foreseen, yet freedom of choice is given." [148]

Let us now summarize the result of our discussion of Philo's theory of free will. Man as a part of nature, a microcosm of the macrocosm, is composed of a rational element which comes from the intelligible world and of a body which is created of matter. As in the world as a whole, these two elements in man are opposed to each other. But whereas in the world reason did by divine decree at the very beginning of the creation of the world gain dominance over the arrant and discordant matter, in man reason did not gain undisputed dominance, for it is not only body that reason has to contend with in man but also a bodily soul, which was itself created by God and endowed by Him with certain powers which are irrational and opposed to the powers of reason. The conflict between these two sets of powers, the rational and irrational, therefore, continues in man throughout his lifetime. Left to themselves, the outcome of the conflict would depend upon the relative strength which these powers would happen to possess or would have developed in the course of man's life.

But God, who in His own case has reserved for himself the power of freedom to upset the laws of nature which He established in the world at the time of its creation, has endowed man with a similar power of freedom to upset the laws of nature to which he is subject. This is a sort of miracle which man can work in the economy of his own life analogous to the miracles which God can work and does work in the economy of the world as a whole. This miraculous power of free will with which the human mind is endowed extends both to the choice of evil and to the choice of good. But there is the following difference between these two kinds of choices. The choice of evil is left wholly to the power of man. The choice of good, however, is not left wholly to man's power. Once man makes an effort to utilize the

[147] Berakot 33b and parallels.

[148] M. Abot III, 15. See notes in C. Taylor, Sayings of the Jewish Fathers, ad III, 24.

power granted to him in overcoming evil and in pursuing good, and once he recognizes that that power of his is a gift from God and that without that gift of God he would be helpless in his effort, and once he prays for further help from God, God will come to his assistance in his effort to overcome the evil and to attain the good. This is merited grace, which applies to all men. But in the case of some men, God endowed them even before their birth with free grace, and such free grace was even inherited by their descendants. In such cases of inherited free grace, while those who are blessed with it are not wholly immune from sin, they will never be allowed by God to sink completely in sin. This freedom of action which man enjoys as a gift of God does not in any way, according to Philo, contravene the prescience of God. Despite the freedom of man to act as he chooses, God may still be said to have foreknowledge of what man will do.

In Philo's conception of human freedom we have an adumbration of all the elements of the problem as it presented itself to the minds of religious philosophers, whether Christian, Moslem or Jewish, throughout the ages. Like Philo, they all as a rule start out with the assumption that there are laws of nature but that these laws were established in the world by God and that God has reserved for himself the freedom to upset these laws on certain occasions and for good reasons in the form of miracles. We may quote St. Augustine as representing this Philonic view among the Church Fathers. "What is there so arranged by the Author of the nature of heaven and earth as the exactly ordered course of the stars? What is there established by laws so sure and inflexible? And yet, when it pleased Him who with sovereignty and supreme power regulates all He has created, a star conspicuous among the rest by its size and splendor changed its color, size, form, and most wonderful of all the order and law of its course." [149] The reference here is to an event recorded in Marcus Varro's De Gente Populi Romani, and later in the same chapter he refers also to the miracles of the sun's standing still and its moving backward which are recorded in Scripture.[150] This view is also represented by St. Thomas in

[149] De Civ. Dei. XXI, 8. Translation by Dods. [150] Jos. 10, 13; Is. 38, 8.

his statements that "God established the order of nature" [151] and that "this order is subject to Him, as proceeding from Him, not by the necessity of His nature, but by the choice of His own will, for He could have created another order of things; wherefore God can do something outside this order created by Him, when He chooses" [152] and that "those things which God does outside those causes which we know are called miracles." [153] Similarly in Arabic philosophy, both Moslem and Jewish, this view is represented by those who argued against the orthodox Kalam's denial of causality and laws of nature as well as against the Aristotelian conception that God acts by the necessity of His nature and without free will. All of these acknowledged the historicity of the miraculous events as recorded in Scripture and the Koran. Indeed not all the miracles recorded in Scripture are of the type that upset the laws of nature, that is, *contra naturam*; some of them are according to nature, though besides nature, that is, *praeter naturam*,[154] and the miraculous element in them consists in the acceleration of the natural process or in its timing. Moreover, some philosophers, especially among the Jews, explained even those miracles which seem to be contrary to nature as events for which God had made provision at the time of the creation of the world and were therefore to some extent part of the order of nature.[155] But however God is conceived by the mediaeval philosophers in His relation to the physical world, whether as acting contrary to nature, or whether as accelerating or timing the processes of nature, or whether as carrying into effect at an opportune time the exceptions to the processes of nature which He had made provision for at the creation of the world, He has retained His character as a free agent and as exercising His freedom of will in His relation to the affairs of mankind.

[151] Sum. Theol. I, 105, 6, obj. 3: *Ordinem naturae Deus instituit.*

[152] Ibid., c.; cf. Cont. Gent. III, 99.

[153] Sum. Theol. I, 105, 7, c.; cf. Cont. Gent. III, 101.

[154] Cf. Maimonides, Ma'amar Tehiyyat ha-Metim c. 49, p. 34, ed. Joshua Finkel; Kobez II, 11rb, where miracles are divided into those which are (1) "impossible by nature" and those which are (2) "possible by nature," corresponding to St. Thomas' (1) *contra naturam* and (2) *praeter naturam* (De Potentia VI, 2, ad 3; II Sent., XVIII, 1, 3c).

[155] Cf. above, n. 58.

It is this freedom of the will of God in His relations to man which is assumed by all mediaeval philosophers that has provided them, as in Philo, with a rationale for their common belief in the free will of man. When God created Adam and implanted in him a mind, He implanted in him therewithal the freedom of choice whereby out of his own free will he disobeyed God and fell. But in Christianity there appeared the belief, given expression to by St. Augustine, that with his fall Adam was deprived of that freedom and that this lack of freedom was inherited by his descendants. If man was still spoken of as having free will, that freedom of the will had to come to him as a grace from God. In other words, the divine grace which according to Philo was only auxiliary to the initial freedom which man possessed became in the case of the descendants of Adam the sole basis of their freedom, a sort of freedom which in reality amounted to a theological determinism. Still the Philonic view has found expression in Christianity. St. Augustine himself, earlier in his life, before he adopted the view with which his name is associated, believed that the descendants of Adam have retained to some extent that freedom of choice with which Adam was endowed by God and that, if they make an effort to exercise that freedom in the right direction, God will further their effort by His adjuvant grace (*gratia adjuvans*).[156] "When anyone perceives that by himself he is not strong enough to rise up, let him pray for the help of the Liberator. Grace then will come, and it will forgive past sins, and help him who exerts himself, and bestow the love of justice.[157] . . . Grace indeed brings about that we shall not only *will* to do rightly but also *be able* to do so, not by our own powers, but by the help of the Liberator.[158] . . . For will is not enough, unless God also shows His mercy; but God, who calls

[156] Cf. F. Loofs, Leitfaden zum Studium der Dogmengeschichte, 4th ed., pp. 360–1, 378.

[157] Expositio quarumdam propositionum ex Epistola ad Romanos, 13 (PL 35, 2065): *cum se quisque cognoverit per seipsum surgere non valere, imploret Liberatoris auxilium. Venit ergo gratia quae donet peccata praeterita, et conantem adjuvet, et tribuat charitatem justitiae.*

[158] Ibid. (2066): *Gratia vero efficit ut non tantum velimus recte facere, sed etiam possimus; non viribus nostris, sed Liberatoris auxilio.*

to peace, does not show His mercy, unless will has preceded, forasmuch as 'peace on earth *is* to men of good will.'" [159] Thus Jerome, commenting on the verse, "Her sins, which are many, are forgiven, for she loved much," [160] says: "From this we understand that it is not by our own power only that we do what we wish but also by the mercy of God, if only He gives assistance to our will." [161] Similarly Cassianus sums up his discussion of free will in the statements that "there always remains in man free will which may either neglect or love the grace of God" [162] and that "the grace of God coöperates with our will favorably and in all things assists it, protects it and defends it." [163]

In connection with free will and grace there appear in Christianity also the other problems which we have found in Philo and the rabbis. As in Philo and the rabbis, in whom we have found either vague or contradictory statements as to the sinlessness of various Scriptural personages, so also in Christianity there appeared the question whether there were men before the appearance of Christ who did not commit sin.[164] Of a similar nature is the problem in Islam as to whether the prophets were sinless.[165] Again as Philo, who held that the special grace of the Patriarchs was inherited by their descendants with the result that Israel would not be allowed by God to go to utter destruction by sin, so also in Christianity Paul declares that "all Israel shall be saved" in the end be-

[159] De diversis Quaestionibus octoginta, 68, 5 (PL 40, 73): *Parum est enim velle, nisi Deus misereatur: sed Deus non miseretur, qui ad pacem vocat, nisi voluntas praecesserit; quia in terra pax hominibus bonae voluntatis.* Cf. Luke 2, 14.

[160] Luke 7, 47.

[161] Dialogus adversus Pelagianos (PL 23, 542 B): *Ex qua intelligimus non nostrae solum esse potestatis facere quod velimus, sed et Dei clementiae, si nostram adjuvet voluntatem.*

[162] Joannis Cassiani Collationes XII (PL 49, 929A): *Et idcirco manet in homine semper liberum arbitrium, quod gratiam Dei possit vel negligere vel amare.*

[163] Ibid., XIII (932A): *Et ita semper gratia Dei nostro in bonam partem cooperatur arbitrio, atque in omnibus illud adjuvat, protegit et defendit.* Cf. St. Augustine, Liber contra collatorem III, 8 (PL 45, 1805).

[164] Not only Pelagius but also Athanasius took the positive view on this question. Cf. Hagenbach, History of Doctrines, §§ 108, n. 3; 110, n. 2.

[165] E. Sell, The Faith of Islam, 3d ed., 1907, p. 244; F. A. Klein, The Religion of Islam, 1906, p. 73; M. Muḥammad Ali, The Religion of Islam, 1936, p. 233.

cause "as touching the election, they are beloved for the fathers' sakes." [166] Then also as in Philo and the rabbis, simultaneously with the free will of man mediaeval philosophers affirmed the foreknowledge of God. But more than Philo and the rabbis they saw the difficulties involved in the assertion of these two propositions. It is this phase of the problem which led in Islam to the denial of freedom on the part of the orthodox Kalam and in Christianity, and to a lesser degree in Judaism, to a restriction of the meaning of freedom. The common tendency, however, was to maintain the two and to find a way of reconciling them. A formula which appears constantly in philosophy is that God's knowledge is not causative. In Christianity among the Church Fathers this formula, as restated by John of Damascus, reads: "God foreknows all things but does not pre-determine them." [167] In Arabic philosophy, the same formula, as quoted in the name of the Mutazilites, reads: "The knowledge of what is to come into existence is not the cause of its coming into existence, just as the knowledge of that which has come into existence is not the cause of its having come into existence." [168] The explanation offered in mediaeval philosophy in support of this principle is rather subtle, but it ultimately amounts to nothing more than the simple assertion of Philo and the rabbis that both God has foreknowledge and man is free.

It is this traditional conception of God's, as well as man's, freedom of the will, which originated in the philosophy of Philo and was maintained throughout mediaeval philosophy, though occasionally somewhat modified, that was made the subject of attack by those who before Spinoza began to nibble at traditional philosophy, and by Spinoza himself in his grand assault on it. The result, in the case of Spinoza, was a return to the classical conception of the immutability of the laws of nature, especially as it was conceived by Aristotle, ere it was modified by Philo's introduction of the principle of the changeability of

[166] Rom. 11, 26–29.

[167] De Fide Orthodoxa II, 30 (PG 94, 969 Bf): *πάντα μὲν προγινώσκει ὁ θεὸς, οὐ πάντα δὲ προορίζει.*

[168] Judah ha-Levi, Cuzari V, 20; cf. Saadia, Emunot we-De'ot IV, 4.

these laws through the miraculous intervention of God. The God of Spinoza, like the God of Aristotle, acts by what traditional philosophy would call the necessity of His own nature but which Spinoza himself defines as true freedom. Man also, according to him, has not that power to overcome his passions which traditional philosophy would call the power of one's free will; but still he himself, like Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics, speaks of man's ability to overcome his passions by knowledge and thereby become free. It is not until the entire conception of immutable laws of nature was called into doubt that absolute undetermined freedom of the human will, like that asserted by Philo, makes its reappearance in philosophy. But the ground for the questioning of the immutability of the laws of nature is not the rediscovery of a God who like the God of Philo and his followers is endowed with a miracle-working power. The historical background of this new view is to be found in the ancient Epicurean denial of causality.